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PUNISHMENT AND WORK LAW COMPLIANCE:
LESSONS FROM CHILE
CdsarF. Rosado Marzdn *'

I. INTRODUCTION: LEARNING FROM A "JAGUAR"

Labor and employment (hereinafter referred to as "work law")
activists and reformers find it increasingly more difficult to obtain
redress for violations of workers' rights. As American activist and legal
reformer Kim Bobo has said, "wage theft" has become an epidemic in
the United States.2 She mentions that according to the United States
Department of Labor, all poultry plants steal workers' wages 3 and many

* PhD, JD. Assistant Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology ("IIT") Chicago-Kent College of Law. Member of Regulating Markets and Labour Programme,
Stockholm University, Institute for Social Private Law, Faculty of Law. This study was
made possible thanks to the IIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law summer research support
and the Handelsman Fund. It was also made possible thanks to the support of the
Chilean Labor Directorate, whose directors, Patricia Silva and Maria Cecilia Sdnchez,
permitted me to work alongside its inspectors and use both office space and computing
and information technology resources of the public institution for seven and half months
with no expectations but that I share my research results once available. I thank
Katherine Baker, Rodrigo Correa, Caterina Guidi, Paola Diaz, Maria Ester Feres, Alvaro
Flores, Sergio Gamonal, Sarah Harding, Hal Krent, Marty Malin, Ariel Rosel, Ver6nica
Riquelme, Cdsar Toledo, Jos6 Luis Ugarte, and Michael Zimmer for reading previous
drafts of this article and providing comments. I also thank the participants of the Faculty
Workshop of lIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law and the University of Illinois College
Law for their helpful feedback. I must also thank Patrick Ferrell, Claire Alfus and the
editorial board of the Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal for their invaluable
editorial assistance. Finally, I thank the innumerable subjects that I observed and
interviewed in Chile during the seven-and-a-half month ethnography that preceded this
paper. All errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author. Address all
comments to crosado@kentlaw.edu.
1. This article contains numerous foreign language sources. The Journal edits and
confirms these sources to the best of its ability but cannot guarantee the accuracy of all
statements. All foreign sources are on file with the author.
2.

See KIM BOBO,

WAGE THEFT

IN AMERICA:

AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID-AND WHAT WE CAN

WHY MILLIONS

Do

ABOUT IT

OF WORKING

8 (2009).

3. See id. at 7.
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other industries trail closely behind.4 She calls for more inspection
resources and punishment tools to better police employers.5 The
Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA") was a proposed bill that the labor
movement hoped would reform the collective labor laws and make it
easier for workers to join unions.6 Importantly, it was also based on
providing the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") with more
powers to punish employers who violated the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA"). 7
Placing the focus on punishing violators certainly has an appeal,
especially given the dire condition of workers' rights today. Wage theft
is rampant throughout multiple industries.8 The capacity of workers to
build and join unions as guaranteed by the NLRA, compared with the
actual percentage of private sector employees who are members of a
union - 24% in 1973, down to 13.5% in 2001, and dropping to less than
7% in 20109 - is also cause for grave concern for organized labor and
workers who want to join unions.' 0
This article does not necessarily take issue with the general request
for more resources and sanctions to enforce work laws. Deterrence is
important. However, scholarship discussing the role of punishment in
regulation and enforcement in work law, but also in many other areas of
law, forces us to pause before putting too many eggs in the punishment
basket. For many years we have now come to comprehend that effective
enforcement requires "smart" combinations of persuasion with
punishment. "

4. See id.
5. See id. at chs. 5-6, 9.
6. See id. at 86.
7. See id.
8. Id.at9.
9. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage
Databasefrom the Current Population Survey, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 349, 352
tbl.1 (2002); Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to a 70-Year Low Last
Jan.
21,
2011,
Year,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22union.html?_r- 1.
10. Although clearly divided on the issue, survey data from 2005 revealed that over
50% of non-unionized American workers would like to have union representation at
work. Richard B. Freeman, Do Workers Still Want Unions? More Than Ever, ECON.
POL'Y INST. (Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.gpn.org/bp 182.html.
11. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992)
[hereinafter AYRES & BRAITHWAITE]; JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE:
ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY (1985) [hereinafter BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR
PERSUADE]; John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34
WORLD DEV. 884 (2006) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation]; Roberto
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I spent seven and a half months studying the labor inspectorate of
Chile, a government agency that enforces work law mostly by punishing
those who break the laws. That empirical study, which will be detailed
in this article,12 supports the view that punishment is insufficient and
may even backfire when enforcing work law if not supplemented with
other enforcement strategies. For example, in the 2010 incident in Chile
where thirty-three miners were trapped in a mine 2300 feet below
ground,13 only to miraculously be rescued, a labor inspector had visited
the mine before the collapse and established that it was a health and
safety risk to the workers.14 Yet, rather than closing the mine, as the
inspector could have done under the law, he only issued a meaningless
fine equaling approximately U.S. $6000.15 The workers continued to
work in the mine even though it was officially considered a work hazard.
The rest is history. The mine collapsed and a mix of great luck, heroic
rescuers, and significant expense saved the lives of the thirty-three
miners. 16
Why did the labor inspector issue such a meaningless fine if he had
found that the mine was a danger to workers and the inspector could
close it? As detailed here, for years the Mining Ministry of Chile,
supportive of mining interests, took over the jurisdiction of the mine
under dubious legal grounds and kept it open. 7 Agencies can
commonly intrude the jurisdictional space of other agencies.1 8 Such
intra-state conflicts even happen in Chile, a country where the rule of
law is allegedly zealously protected.1 9
The San Jos6 mine incident and other cases detailed in this article
Pires, Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance
Outcomes in Brazil, 147 INT'L LAB. REV. 199 (2008).
12. See infra Part V.
13. Trapped Chile Miner's Family Sues Owners and Officials, BBC NEWS (Aug.
26, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america- 11102478.
14. Cdsar F. Rosado Marzdn, Working for Another Miracle, CHI.-KENT C.L. FAC.
BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010), http://blogs.kentlaw.edu/faculty/2010/09/working-for-anothermiracle.html [hereinafter Rosado Marzdn, Another Miracle].
15. Id.
16. See Victor Herrero, All 33 Miners Rescuedfrom Chile Mine, USA TODAY (Oct.
14, 2010, 12:13 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-10-12-ChileminersN.htm#.T5IP58BhJyY.email.
17. See infra Part VII.
18. The now classical sociologist, Max Weber, already discussed how state
administrators may hold "office secrets" to hoard power and encroach on areas not under
their authority. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE
SOCIOLOGY 992 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans.,
Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968).
19. See infra Part III.A.
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lead me to conclude that the Chilean case supports what some legal
scholars and social scientists have been finding about punishment-based,
"command and control" regulation and enforcement: a culture of
resistance develops when agencies insist on mostly punishing the
regulated actors.
Resistance can then lead to noncompliance.
Participatory arrangements for workplace governance and flexible
standard settings can help reduce resistance and provide a better
environment for enforcement.
This article is divided in the following way:
Section II of the article describes the reasons why punishment
matters for work law enforcement. Conversely, Section III describes the
literature advocating for non-punishment-based strategies.
Section IV details how Chile is a country with high rule-of-law
indicators. It also details its punitive administrative enforcement
institution for work law enforcement. Section V further explains why
Chile is a useful case study for understanding the pros and cons of
punishment strategies.
Finally, the Section speaks to regulatory
polemics and theories of punishment (or persuasion) detailed in Sections
II and III.
Section V explains my seven-and-a-half month ethnography of the
Chilean labor inspectorate and its labor courts to understand how its
enforcement institutions work in practice. This ethnography lets us
understand the realities and not just the formalities of regulation and
enforcement.
Section VI details the likely strengths of the punitive system that I
observed in Chile where labor inspectors can fine for a diversity of work
law infractions due to their general competence over all sections of the
labor code,2 ° which creates a significant authority for inspectors to
leverage against employers who fail to follow the country's work laws.
This punitive strategy, to fine for any and all infractions, is also useful to
resolve individual termination settlements in which labor inspectors are
readily involved. Although employment dismissals fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of labor courts, inspectors who believe that the
employer is violating the law may seek to fine the employer for failing
to provide proper documentation and other unrelated infractions during
the pre-trial conciliation process. Fining increases the cost of the
termination to the employer and compels the employer to settle. Finally,
inspectors can also serve as mere "nuisances." Even without fining,
20. Some of these sections include collective labor law, individual employment
law, employment discrimination, and health and safety.
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their visits at workplaces get in the way of production. Since no
employer wants an inspector snooping around the workplace, the mere
likelihood of a visit by an inspector may deter the employer from
breaking the law.
Section VII of the article details the soft "underbelly" of the DT,
Employer
which spurs slack enforcement and noncompliance.
resistance against the DT is at the heart of this soft underbelly.
Resistance is commonplace in Chile, particularly when the inspectorate
imposes stiff penalties on strong employers who can fight back through
legal challenges and political strategies. One example where resistance
rendered the inspectorate powerless was during the inspectorate's
attempt to enforce a law that limited subcontracting. Because fining was
apparently insufficient to compel compliance with the law in the
important mining sector, the inspectorate ordered the publicly owned
mining company, Codelco, to directly hire 5,000 employees that it had
allegedly illegally subcontracted. Codelco and the subcontractors took
the inspectorate to court alleging, among other things, that the
inspectorate attempted to enforce an equitable remedy by commanding
them to hire 5,000 workers. The employers argued correctly, that the
inspectorate could only establish facts, determine a violation, and fine.
The Supreme Court of Chile not only held in favor of the employers and
reversed the actions of the inspectorate, but determined that the
inspectorate could not even establish violations of the subcontracting
law because such actions would entail interpreting labor contracts, a
competence reserved only to labor courts. As a result of this decision,
the anti-subcontracting law was rendered effectively unenforceable. The
situation would have been different if the labor inspectorate could have
coordinated bargaining between Codelco, the subcontractors, and
employee representatives to bring the large company into compliance
gradually. Cooperation could have worked better than a unilateral and
illegal mandate made to the corporation.
A second important case shows that employers can also effectively
resist even when the inspectorate acts legally. This was the case of the
San Josd mine, as previously discussed. 21 There, the inspectorate had
closed the mine in 2003 when a partial collapse occurred. The mine was
reopened shortly thereafter by the Servicio Nacional de Geologia y
Mineria, or National Service for Geology and Mining (hereinafter
referred to as "Semageomin," its Spanish acronym), a sub agency of the
Mining Ministry with the authority to close and open mines. In 2010,
21.

See discussion supra pp. 345-46.
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weeks before the collapse that held the 33 miners captive, there was
another partial collapse. The inspectorate went to the mine but did not
close it, claiming that closure was under the competence of
Semageomin. Such statements were clearly inapposite to the law, as
will be discussed in this article. Politics prevailed over law. I argue the
case would have been different if the inspectorate not only closed the
mine but had authority to negotiate with the mine owners, Sernageomin,
and workers in order to persuade them on a plan for a gradual reopening
of the mine that met all health and safety concerns. Strong punishment,
but also cooperation, was needed as this article will argue.
Section VIII details an instance where the inspectorate
experimented with a non-punitive strategy for mass compliance with the
work laws. This experience related to the massive terminations ordered
by employers during the terrible earthquake that struck Chile in 2010.
Terminations reached about 9000 in just a few weeks. In some cities
such as Concepci6n, unemployment reached unheard of levels of close
to 20%, generating a social crisis on top of a natural disaster. Then, the
inspectorate issued a simple interpretation of the termination rules. The
interpretation stated that the earthquake could not be generally used to
justify terminations under force majeure, one of the statutory defined
causes for termination in Chile. As a result of that administrative
interpretation, which was not legally binding but was disseminated
widely by the press and government, and with support of the President
of the country, more than 2600 of the 9000 terminations were voluntarily
rescinded by employers in a matter of weeks. There was no need to send
armies of inspectors to fine. Primarily pedagogical actions did much of
the compliance work.
Section IX concludes the article by arguing how the Chilean case
unambiguously supports scholarship that calls for more than just
punishment for work law enforcement. Even if the country is generally
highly regarded for its rule-of-law reputation, its capacity to compel
employers to comply with the work laws is limited by a truncated
punishment orientation. Chile should experiment with pedagogical
strategies, and so should the United States and other jurisdictions still
enveloped in legalistic, adversarial, and punishment-based work law
compliance regimes.

I. How PUNISHMENT MATTERS
The case of punishment is straightforward. It helps deter the
scofflaws. Punishment in the form of sanctions, fines, and expensive
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lawsuits should act as deterrents on those employers who are considering
not complying with work laws.22 If agencies in charge of enforcing the
laws have thin resources and weak sanctioning powers, employers will
quickly take the hint that noncompliance has no bottom line
consequences. Paying overtime, respecting concerted activities by
workers, and following health and safety rules have real costs.
Noncompliance may not. Under such a structure of incentives to not
comply, noncompliance may become rampant.
In the case of wage theft, for example, the Executive Director of the
Interfaith Worker Jusitce, Kim Bobi has argued that the Department of
Labor has inadequate resources to police wages and hours regulations.
She calls for more inspectors and harsher punishments.24 As she told the
AFL-CIO in an interview:
Most important, we need more cops on the job. There are 750
investigators for 130 million workers in the country, and it's just not
enough. I believe we need to quadruple that staff. Now, some people
ask how we can do that in this economic environment. But my
response is that if we make it a priority, we can make it happen. After
9/11, we hired 52,000 people to go through my luggage and pull out
my toothpaste. It was a priority, and we made it happen.
Finally, we need to have meaningful punishments. If you steal wages
from workers, there needs to be consequences and you need to feel
them. That's especially true for repeat violators. Right now, only 40
percent of repeat violators even get fined at all. Even if back wages
are paid, we've found it's usually about 50 cents on the dollar.
Employers are making out like bandits. If they steal
wages, it's a good
25
business plan because in the end it costs them less.
According to Bobi, the incentives against wage theft seem to be
misplaced. The noncompliance situation must be fixed by hiring more
"cops" and punishing more.
In the case of the collective labor law, EFCA promised to resolve
the dwindling rates of union density by providing, among other reforms,
new enforcement powers to the NLRB, namely to issue punitive

22.
23.
24.
25.

See BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR PERSUADE, supra note 11, at 92-93.
See BOBO, supra note 2, at 118-21.
See id.
Kim Bobo, Wage Theft in America: A Crisis We Can Solve, AFL-CIO,

http://www.rnsworkingtogether.netr/mediacenter/speakout/kimbobo.cfm
Apr. 13, 2012).
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damages and civil penalties against employers who violated the law.26
The logic was clear: by increasing the costs of noncompliance in the
form of higher penalties, noncompliance with the NLRA could be
deterred.
On the health and safety front, scholars have noted the almost
disastrous state of federal workplace health and safety law, particularly27
that related to the Occupational Health and Safety Act ("OSHA").
Even though the Occupational Health and Safety Administration was
redesigned during the Clinton era, the agency has undertaken a number
of compliance-based initiatives since the Reagan years, including the
Voluntary Protection Program ("VPP"). 28 The VPP provides that
employers who voluntarily establish workplace safety programs and
accept regular inspections by the agency will, in return, obtain laxer
However, the Obama
punishment if violations are found.29
Administration seems to have changed course when it comes to
compliance assistance at OSHA. As one publication for the professional
development of management-side lawyers expressed, the Obama
administration has taken a "pro-worker" stance that seems to have
become more assertively punitive. 30 As the publication states:
The fiscal year 2010 budget funded one hundred new OSHA
inspectors, and the fiscal year 2011 budget proposes to hire twenty-five
more inspectors and move [thirty-five] OSHA employees from
26. Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. § 4 (2009). The other two
important elements of EFCA were "cards checks" and interest arbitration for first
contracts. "Card checks", or proof of majority support through documents signed by
employees, usually a union card, would help unions organize workplaces out the need
for time-consuming, costly and adversarial NLRB administered union elections. See id.
§§ 2-3. The second element of the reform would have mandated interest arbitration for
first contracts if the parties failed to reach a new contract within a specified period of
time. See id. Compulsory interest arbitration for first contracts would have guaranteed
that the union would obtain a contract and not find itself in endless negotiations that can
destroy the momentum and support of the union at the workplace.
27. See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 1071, 1078 (2005) [hereinafter
Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory]; see also EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN,
GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 28 (1982)

(describing how OSHA barely has any effect on workplace safety).
28. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 319, 343-44 (2005) [hereinafter Estlund, Rebuilding the
Law].
29. See id. at 343.
30. Michael R. Blum, The Trendfor IncreasedRegulation of Employers Under the
Current Administration, in COMPLYING WITH EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS 29, 51 (Eddie

Foumier ed., 2010).
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31
compliance assistance to enforcement.

In this manner, the current Obama administration seems to be
increasing resources and penalties against those who violate the law.
Such calls and policies for tougher sanctions make intuitive sense,
especially given the state of (dis)organized labor, wage theft, and
employer impunity in the face of health and safety law violations.
However, as we will see below, there are reasons to be at least skeptical
of the role of mere punishment for work law compliance.

III. How NON-PUNITIVE ENFORCEMENT ALSO MATTERS
While stronger and tougher enforcement may deter violations of
work law, scholarship based on "New Governance," responsive
regulation, and traditional "Latin" inspection suggests that more than
mere punishment is needed.
Participatory processes, combining
persuasion with punishment, and applying standards flexibly - attuned
to industry and market realities - are likely as important as punishment.
A. New Governance
New Governance is a normative movement within the law that
seeks to bring together various strands of scholarly work spread across
various disciplines.3 2 It tries to fill in the gap between traditional
regulation and neoliberal deregulation.33
According to Professor
Bradley C. Karkkainen, New Governance generally refers to a "broad
family of innovative modes of public governance" in the European
Union, the United States, and elsewhere that steer away from "the
familiar model of command-style, fixed regulation by administrative

3 1. Id. These statements reflect exactly the agenda that the Obama administration
itself has laid out for OSHA. David Michaels, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health expressed that because there was "a new sheriff in
town" OSHA would not only attempt to hire more inspectors but "return to the original
intent of the OSH Act and make setting and enforcing workplace standards [their] central
focus." David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y of Labor for Occupational Safety & Health,
Speech Delivered at the American Society of Safety Engineers Professional
Development Conference & Expo (June 14, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?ptable=SPEECHES&pid
=2221). This focus included moving personnel to "enforcement." Id.
32. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and
in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471,
471-72 (2004).
33. Seeid. at 471-73.
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fiat" regulation, and "toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party,
multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving" regulation.34
Professor Cynthia Estlund summarizes the two main characteristics
of New Governance as "decentering" and "reflexive. 35 Decentering
refers to bringing non-state actors into the regulatory process by giving
them a real say.36 Reflexivity refers to replacing direct regulatory
commands with "self-regulation." 37 The general idea behind most
strands of New Governance is that state and non-state actors participate
in the acts of creating and enforcing rules.38
New Governance advocates argue that traditional regulation - one
that is prescribed and enforced only by the state, and otherwise known as
"command and control" - is to blame for most regulatory crises, both
within and outside of the workplace. 39 "Command and control" is
essentially a rules-based regulatory regime that reached its full
expression in the Great Society programs of the 1960s and "the
' °
consumer protection and 'environmental decade' of the 197os. 4
Europe and other parts of the world shared similar regulatory
frameworks.41 In this manner, command and control suits the traditional
Weberian bureaucratic characteristics. 42 Command and control has
been:
[Hlierarchical, state-centric, bureaucratic, top-down and expert-driven.
[It] attempted to microengineer solutions to societal problems through
a series of fragmentary, piecemeal, and highly prescriptive regulatory
34.
35.

See id. at 472-73.
See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELFREGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 136 (2010) [hereinafter ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE].

36. See id.
37. See id. Exactly what scholars mean by "self-regulation" is contested. Estlund
develops one view of self-regulation, "co-regulation," where employers and employees
set the rules together. Id. at 161. Public enforcement also matters. Id.at 241. Ayres
and Braithwaite, scholars from whom some New Governance advocates draw their ideas,
advocate for so-called "enforced self-regulation" where parties do not only cooperate to
regulate themselves, but their rules can be thereafter enforced by a public body. AYRES
& BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 103; see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342, 388 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel, The Renew Deal] (detailing how "hard"
ordering of the regulatory model should be replaced with a "soft" one and providing a
more deregulatory view on New Governance).
38. See ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 35, at 136.
39. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 37, at 357-58, 361.
40. Karkkainen, supra note 32, at 473-74.
41. Id.
42. See WEBER, supra note 18, at 956-1005.
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interventions, and it tended to produce an impossibly complex and

tangled web of rigid, uniform one-size-fits-all rules that in truth did not
quite fit anyone.
In this manner, traditional command-and-control regulation
imposes rules in a top-down fashion from the state, and is oftentimes too
complicated to be rationally instituted. It may be under or overinclusive, making it ineffective. 44 Conversely, agencies may simply be
captured and rendered agents of particularistic interests.45 Regulators
frequently may also count with little reliable information about the
conditions of regulated parties and the impact of the regulations on those
parties, making it highly ineffectual.4 6 The emblematic case of
regulatory failure is OSHA, an agency with a morass of rules made in
eras with now antiquated technologies and obsolete knowledge of health,
safety, and market contexts.4 7 For most work law scholars, the
unpalatable alternative that is deregulation and the potential crises
associated with it has led to a "Third Way" of thought regarding
regulation - New Governance. 48 New Governance advocates view
with care policies calling for stricter penalties. 49 They claim that
attention needs to be put not just on punishing the violators, but also on
how the regulations themselves are drafted and by whom. 50 In fact, New
Governance values removing the enforcement process from the state. 51
It does not leave the state devoid of a role, but infuses the regulatory and
enforcement process with civil society participation. In the case of wage
theft, for example, New Governance would likely focus on establishing
minimum wages through participatory processes where workers and
employers have a voice. Enforcement would not be left only to state
enforcers, but workers would have a role to play as the eyes and ears of
the state enforcers. Their whistleblower role would be zealously
protected by courts and enforced through private causes of action. In the
43.
44.

Karkkainen, supra note 32, at 474.
See Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in

JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR,
CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 3, 9 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).

45.

Id.

46.

PETER

EVANS,

EMBEDDED

AUTONOMY:

STATES

AND

INDUSTRIAL

TRANSFORMATION 31-32 (1995) (describing how mere "aloof detachment" by
bureaucrats is not enough for effective public administration).
47. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 37, at 415-16.
48. Id. at 442.
49. In fact, Orly Lobel calls directly for 'softer' processes that either replace or
complement the traditional 'hard' ordering of the regulatory model." Id. at 388.
50. Id. at 391.
51. ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 35, at 146.
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case of collective labor law, any national reforms could be directed by
participatory processes between the regulated actors - employers and
workers - perhaps not too differently from the prescribed methods of
tripartism promulgated by the International Labor Organization. 52
Similarly, effective workplace health and safety laws should require
voluntary, internal health and safety plans with enforcement roles for
workers. 3
B. Responsive Regulation and Latin Inspectorates
New Governance has been inspired by a number of heterodox
regulatory
perspectives
including,
importantly,
"responsive
54
regulation.,
Responsive regulation is a policy-making movement that
stems from the work of John Braithwaite and his collaborators. 5 It
seeks to create a regulatory strategy that protects "'institutional integrity
while taking into account new problems, new forces in the environment,
new demands, and expectations.,, 56 It considers the changing nature of
social realities and the limits of law and regulation to accommodate and
predict such changes.5 7 In this manner, responsive regulation attempts to
account for unintended consequences of the regulatory endeavor. It calls
for a regulatory framework that adapts to changing realities while
keeping faithful to general principles or standards.
In trying to delineate an effective regulatory enforcement strategy,
responsive regulation advocates strive to combine punishment with
persuasion.58 According to responsive regulation adherents, punishment
works only with the "bad apples." 59 Enforcement strategies that focus
only on punishment generate adversarial relationships with the regulated
parties that may result in resistance, culminating in political conflicts60
against the regulators and, perhaps, against regulation generally.
Persuasion is effective for those regulated parties that want to follow the

52. See Labour Law, INT'L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-ofwork/labour-law/lang--en/index.htm (last visited June 7, 2012).
53. See generally Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory, supra note 27, at 1071.
54. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11; BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR
PERSUADE, supra note 11; Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 11, at 884.
55. See Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 11, at 884.
56. Id. at 884 (citing PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL
THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 336 (1992)).
57. See id. at 884-85.
58. See BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR PERSUADE, supra note 11.
59. See id.
60. BARDACH &KAGAN, supra note 27, at 112-16.
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law but because of ignorance and related considerations cannot
comply.61 Responsive regulation approaches the regulated actors
through an escalating strategy that starts with persuasive tactics
("carrots") and moves to deterrent, punishment tactics ("sticks"),
reserving the ultimate penalty - "incapacitation," such as closing down
62
operations - to those actors who persistently fail to comply.
Regulators should be "benign big guns," the proverbial authority figures
that "speak softly and carry big sticks. 6 3
The idea is that
"noncompliance comes to be seen as ... a slippery slope that inexorably
leads to a sticky end." 64
Moreover, according to Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite,
the state should not be left alone in the task of regulation.65 Civil society
should be a central part of the enforcement pyramid to serve as a check
on state capture and to perform regulatory tasks such as "naming and
66
shaming, restorative justice, consumer boycotts, strikes and litigation."
In this manner, regulation is not a purely top-down activity, but it is also
a bottom-up endeavor. It is here from where New Governance drew part
of its inspiration.
The literature on "Latin" inspectorates also shares some similarities
with responsive regulation, particularly that dealing with the ways
regulators deal with "good and bad apples. '67
"Latin" labor
inspectorates are work law enforcement institutions whose main agents
are labor inspectors, "street-level bureaucrats ' 68 who function as a sort
of labor police "on the beat.' 69 Following what could be identified as a
responsive regulatory framework, Latin labor inspectors are said not to
61.

AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 20-21.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 11, at 887.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 19.
Id.
See id.
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 11, at 888.
See ANDREW SCHRANK & MICHAEL PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO,

67.
SERIE ESTUDIOS Y
PERSPECTIVAS: NORMS, REGULATIONS AND LABOR STANDARDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, at

43-47, U.N. Doc. 77, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.G.44 (2007), available at
http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/28113/Serie%2077.pdf [hereinafter SCHRANK
& PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO]; Michael Piore & Andrew Schrank, Toward a Managed
Flexibility: The Revival of Labour Inspection in the Latin World, 147 INT'L LAB. REV. 1,
14-16 (2008) [hereinafter Piore & Schrank, Managed Flexibility]; Pires, supra note 11,
at 199-201; Andrew Schrank, Professionalizationand Probity in the PatrimonialState:
Labor Inspectors in the Dominican Republic, 51 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y. 91, 92
(2009) [hereinafter Schrank, ProfessionalismandProbity].
68. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN PUBLIC SERVICES 2 (2007).

69.

Id. at 4.
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depend primarily on sanctions ("sticks") to compel compliance with the
work laws. They are said to use persuasive "conciliation and/or
remediation" enforcement strategies.7 ° Under this approach, labor
inspectors attempt to persuade employers that work law compliance is
efficient and good for their business rather than just a cost that will make
the firm less competitive.7 1 Inspectors can impose sanctions, but these
are not their main or only tools to compel compliance with the law.
Following what seems to be the responsive, pyramidal structure of
compliance, Latin labor inspectors reserve sanctions for the more serious
cases.73 They use persuasion as their main tool of compliance.74 Such
strategies may include everything from simply making the employer
cognizant of his or her duties under the law, promoting best practices to
help employers implement the law efficiently or bringing together
parties to the bargaining table to develop plans on how to bring the firm
into compliance gradually, but surely.75
Another important characteristic of Latin labor inspectorates is their
centralized administrative structure and general competence.7 6 They
have authority to police work law compliance generally and are not
limited by areas of specialization, as tends to exist in the AngloAmerican world, particularly in the US. 77 Rather than having exclusive
groups of inspectors and other agents housed in various enforcement
agencies with different jurisdictions -for example the NLRB, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Office, OSHA, the Wages and Hours Division
of the Department of Labor, and their state-level pairs - labor inspectors
in the Latin world are housed and managed from one central, and
national, labor inspectorate.78
Administrative centralization is supposed to enhance the
discretionary authority of labor inspectors. This enables them to
strategically choose which industries and employers to focus on and to
discover where more acute noncompliance problems exist. In this
70.

See Michael J. Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies in Labor Market Regulation, in

THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 385, 388 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011)

[hereinafter Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies].
71. See Schrank, Professionalizationand Probity, supra note 67, at 100-01.
72. See Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies,supra note 70, at 387-88.
73. Schrank, Professionalizationand Probity, supra note 67, at 10 1-02 (detailing
pedagogic and escalating sanctions in "Latin" inspection systems).
74. See Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies, supra note 70, at 388; Schrank,
Professionalizationand Probity,supra note 67, at 101.
75. Schrank, ProfessionalizationandProbity, supra note 67, at 101.
76. See SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 10.
77. See id. at 10, 14.
78. Id.
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manner, discretion also provides the inspectorate with flexibility when
applying sanctions or otherwise exerting their authority. '9 As Professor
Michael Piore argues:
Because the inspectors cannot possibly inspect for every provision of
the code, they are effectively in a position to pick and choose which
provisions they will look at, where to focus their attention. They can
weigh the different aspects of the law, and in effect the different goals
of legislation, against each other and against the viability of the
enterprise, adjusting the regulations to the particularities of each
establishment and to the economic and social environment in which it
operates. Their ability to work out the process through which the
enterprise comes into compliance gives them further latitude to adjust
the code. Thus, for example, they might enforce health and safety
standards more stringently and allow less time to come into
compliance in a tight labor market where unemployment is low and
jobs are plentiful than in a recession, when imposing the costs 80
of
compliance risks driving the firm out of business and destroying jobs.
According to Piore, the contrast with the United States' system is
stark. In the United States, the narrow jurisdiction of an agency's
officers and agents gives little wiggle room to pick and choose which
rules to focus on given certain market and industry conditions
and how
81
law.
the
with
comply
to
parties
regulated
the
compel
to
A third relevant characteristic of Latin labor inspection is that the
line agents, the labor inspectors, are professionals subject to review and
discipline by their profession and not just by the bureaucracy for which
they work.8 2 Professional self-regulation promotes better quality work
and limits the chances of capture. In the Dominican Republic, for
example, one of the ways that the labor inspectorate has been
successfully reformed has been by requiring new labor inspectors to
have law degrees. 83 Because they are lawyers, the new labor inspectors
are subject to review and supervision by the lawyers' bar. Indiscipline
and corruption could lead to their disbarment, destroying their capacity
to make a living as state agents or as private attorneys. 84
With all of this being said, Latin America is not exactly known for
79. Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies,supra note 70, at 388.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MExICO, supra note 67, at 11, 15, 32.
83. State of the
Working
World: Dominican Republic,
http://www.verite.org/SWW/DominicanRepublic (last visited June 8, 2012).

84.

VERITI,

See id
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its high-quality state institutions and strict adherence to the rule of law.
What, then, has the "Latin" inspection system been able to do
successfully in Latin America? Let us take the case of Brazil.
According to researcher Roberto Pires, the most successful cases of
labor inspection in Brazil are those where inspectors "bring firms into
compliance with the law by finding legal and/or technical solutions that
create positive incentives for firms to improve working conditions and
remain in compliance. 85
The labor inspectorate in Brazil recently identified significant
noncompliance with health and safety rules in the automotive industry.86
In response to these findings, the inspectorate decided to follow a
strategy which aimed to persuade auto manufacturers that making
87
significant investments in health and safety implements was desirable.
For these ends, inspectors searched for and provided information to
employers regarding the existence of cost-efficient protective
equipment.88 They also identified subsidized credit for employers to
purchase the protective machinery. 89 As a result of such conciliatory
and remedial, even facilitative actions for compliance, 70% of the autoOfficial
manufacturing employers invested in the technologies. 90
accidents were lowered by 66%.91
In another regulatory area, wage and hour regulations, the Brazilian
labor inspectorate was also able to formalize the employment contracts
of so-called "cordeiros.9 2 Annually in Brazil, more than 70,000
workers are hired on a temporary basis to serve as cordeirosduring what
has become the "mega-event" of Carnival. 93 Cordeiros are the workers
that hold the ropes that separate the crowds watching Carnival from the
members of dancing and music troupes participating in the event.94
Given the informal employment arrangements, cordeiroswere subject to
abuse. 95 Non-payment and underpayment of wages was common. 96 On
the flip side, the low quality nature of the job lent itself to poor job

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Pires, supra note 11, at 206.
Id. at 209-10.
See id. at 210-11.
Id.
Id. at211.

90.

See id.

91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.

94.

See id.

95.
96.

See id. at 207-08.
Id. at 208.
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attachment and turnover. 97 Many cordeiros would abandon their jobs,
even during official working time, for better-paying work offered to
them. 98 Informality was bad for business and for the cordeiros.
While both workers and employers seem to have suffered from the
evils of informality, neither group felt compelled to formalize the
On one hand, formally hiring and
employment relationship. 99
terminating the employment contracts of about 1,000 cordeiros, which,
according to Pires, was the average number of cordeiros hired by each
employer, was administratively challenging and costly. 100 On the other
hand, many workers did not want their cordeiro job to appear in their
formal employment history' 0 ' because of the stigma associated with such
a position, so cordeiros
preferred the evil of informality to the evil of
02
stigmatization.1
The solution that the inspectorate found to resolve the double bind
caused by informality was to target the entire Carnival industry and find
a solution that addressed both worker and employer interests. In
consultation with workers and employers, the labor inspectors helped to
create:
[A]n alternative formal arrangement for temporary hiring - namely, a
service provision contract [rather than a formal employment contract]
specific to cordeiros, which [was] basically made up of clauses
concerned with minimum daily rates, breaks, food, gloves, insurance
This temporary employment contract
against accidents, etc.
established basic protections for workers while giving firms a viable
way to formalize their labour force and provide better quality service
for their patrons ... 103
In the example of the Carnival, the inspectorate undertook a nonpunitive, compliance-based, multi-party, and participatory methodology
to bring employers into compliance, 104 the combined prescriptions of
New Governance and responsive regulation.
However, contemporary labor inspection still has problems. While
there is enthusiasm over the renaissance of Latin inspection, the
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 208.
100. Id.
101. All employees in Brazil have a formal work history called a carteira de
trabalho. See id.
102. See id
103. Id.
104. Id. at 199.
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resurgence of Latin inspectorates in the developing world has not
produced the same results everywhere.10 5 Even Pires, for example, has
identified uneven successes in Brazil. 10 6 While "sticks" seldom work
alone, toothless conciliation or remedial strategies are similarly
ineffective.'0 7 Researchers paying attention to Central American and
Caribbean countries since the signing of the Central American and
Dominican Republic Free Trade Act with the United States (CAFTADR) likewise have noticed mixed results after the trade agreements
imposed special work law enforcement duties on the parties.'0 8 In
Argentina, research has also noticed differing degrees of success
determined by the role that workers have played in aiding labor
inspectors, 0 9 dovetailing with New Governance and responsive
regulation propositions that inclusive and participatory frameworks
matter for effectiveness. To bring back Ayres and Braithwaite,] 10 statesociety relations matter."'
IV. THE CHILEAN CASE "ON THE BOOKS"

The case of Chile can contribute to debates regarding the utility of
punishing versus persuading employers to comply with the work laws.
If there is a jurisdiction in the world where punishment should be
working properly, it is Chile. Chile is known for its high quality
institutions and strong rule of law. The administrative orientation of
work law enforcement is also strongly punitive.
A. Rule of Law
Some may be skeptical about lessons that could be drawn for the
105.
different
as Costa
106.
107.
108.

109.

See SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 23-29 (detailing the
approaches to the labor market regulation in Central American countries such
Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala).
See Pires, supra note 11, at 203-06.
See id. at 204-06.
See generallySCHRANK & PIoRE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67.
See Matthew Amengual, Changes in State Capacity to Respond to Labor

Standard Violations:Enforcement in the Garment Workshops of Buenos Aires, MIT
SLOAN SCHOOL OF MGMT. INST. FOR WORK & EMP. RES. 19 (Jan. 11, 2012), available at
http://web.mit.edu/amengual/www/Amengual-ILOChapter-2012-01 -11 .pdf.
110. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 111, at 3-4 ("If we accept that sound policy

analysis is about understanding private regulation... and how it is interdependent with
state regulation, then interesting possibilities open .... ").
11l.

See also EVANS, supra note 46, at 29 (discussing the importance of being

proactive and the cooperation of state-society relations).
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United States and others from Chile, a medium-sized, if not small, still
developing country. While true that Chile's geography, population,
culture, wealth, and many other differences only make it an imperfect
model for almost any other developed nation, we should not easily
disregard lessons that can be drawn from its experiences. First, Chile is
regarded as one of the most institutionally sophisticated states in the
world."1 2 Not a single country in Latin America and the Caribbean14
13 World Bank indicators"
surpasses Chile's institutional qualities.'
place Chile as the Latin American country with the strongest support for
the rule of law." 5 Other World Bank indicators, such as regulatory
quality and control of corruption, place Chile at the top 10th percentile
globally.1 6 Indexes by other organizations that measure rule of law in
also put Chile as a country with strong rule of law
different ways
7
institutions.''

OF
FINANCE,
CHILE:
MINISTRY
DE
112. Why
Chile?, GOBIERNO
(last updated
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/investor-relations-office/why-chile.html
May 2012).
113. See id.
114. Daniel Kaufmann et al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology
and Analytical Issues 9 (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 5430,
2009) [hereinafter referred to as Daniel Kauffman, The Worldwide Governance
Indicators]. The World Bank reports six "governance" indicators, including "rule of
law." These are measured in a units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values
corresponding to better governance outcomes. Id. The World Bank's rule of law index
measures perceptions on "the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." Id. at 4.
Note, "rule of law" is a contested concept, with some analysts advocating for "thin" and
other "thick" accounts. Id.at 3. "Thin" accounts of the rule are narrowly focused on the
country's adherence to rules, while a "thick" account is broader and attempts to consider
higher-ordered values such as substantive justice. Id. In this paper, I do not take sides
on this debate, as it is beside the paper's thesis. I do stress, however, that under most
metrics of rule of law, Chile tends to come ahead.
115. See Transparency and the Rule of Law in Latin America: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 127
at
available
(2005),
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa2l398.000/hfa21398 0f.htm.
116. See Worldwide Governance Indicators: Country Data Report for CHILE,
5,
7,
INST.,
BANK
WORLD
1996-2010,
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/c41 .pdf.
117. For example, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) by the Bertelsmann
Foundation offers a rule of law measure for developing economies that considers
"democratization" and "market liberalization" and "evaluates reformers' actions,
decisions and management within a country." Ver6nica Michel, The Rule of Law:
Definition and Measurement (2010) (unpublished memo on file with author). The index
is based on a 1-10 point scale, with 1 being the worst and 10 being the best score. Id.
According to the BTI's survey of more than 140 developing countries in 2009, Chile
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In terms of work law regulation and enforcement, Chile also seems
to be at the head of the pack. A recent report showed that Chile
provided relatively more resources for work law regulation and
enforcement than any Latin American country, with just more than 19.25
inspectors for every 100,000 workers in the economy.' 18 The second
highest country, Guatemala, counted 7.53 inspectors per 100,000
workers. 119
ranked 9th with a score of 8.99.
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI),
BERTELSMANN FOUNDATION (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.bertelsmann-transformationindex.de/en/bti. Uruguay was the only Latin American country with a higher score, with
9.25. Id. Another index, the Global Integrity Index (GII) measures levels of governance
and anti-corruption trends. Ver6nica Michel, The Rule of Law: Definition and
Measurement (2010) (unpublished memo on file with author).As part of what are defined
as "anti-corruption mechanisms" this index provides a measure of "rule of law and
access to justice." Id. Rule of law is measured by considering "legal equality,
impartiality, and access [to justice]." Id. However, the GII only covers a select group of
countries each year, raising serious difficulties for general, comparative analysis across
time. Id. However, even then, the evidence strongly favors a view that Chile generally
respects the rule of law. In 2008, the GII measured the rule of law in five Latin
American and Central American countries, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador and
Nicaragua, and placed Chile at the top of the list. Claudia Lagos Lira, Reporter's
Notebook:
Chile,
GLOBAL
INTEGRITY
REPORT,
http://report.globalintegrity.org/Chile/2008/notebook (last visited June 11, 2012).
Other rules of law indexes do not contain a measure for Chile. These other indexes are
the
ABA's
Judicial
Reform
Index
(http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/judicial-reform-index-factorsshtml)
Freedom
House (http://www.freedomhouse.org), and the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index
(http://www.worldjusticeproject.org). Ver6nica Michel, The Rule of Law: Definition and
Measurement (2010) (unpublished memo on file with author) (describing the various,
existing, rule of law indexes).
118. SCHRANK & PioPE, ECLAC/MExICO, supra note 67, at 22. Note, however, that
a recent, internal DT report established that Chile counts only 1 inspector per 18.626
workers, or 5.36 inspectors per 10,000 workers, significantly less than the amount
reported by Schrank and Piore's ECLAC report. Enrique Prez Mendoza, Desafios para
la profesionalizaci6n y mejoramiento de la gesti6n de la inspecci6n del trabajo en Chile,
4, 6-7 (internal DT memo, on file with author). This possible divergence in the numbers
is likely explained by the fact that the occupational classification of "inspector"
(fiscalizador)is a generic category in Chile. Many "inspectors" perform duties that have
little to do with field inspections, from administrative to conciliation duties in the various
DT offices. Id. According to the internal report, the actual number of field inspectors in
Chile in 2009 was 357. Id. These had to serve a total of 18,626,000 workers in the
country. Id.
Nevertheless, even if Chile only counted 5.36 inspectors per 10,000 employed workers
in the country, Chile would still be among the countries with the most labor inspectors in
the region, behind only to Guatemala (7.53), Uruguay (5.79), Panama (5.6), and the
Dominican Republic (5.54), followed by Costa Rica (4.66), Honduras (3.97), Argentina
(3.05), Paraguay (2.7), Brazil (2.45), El Salvador (2.28), Mexico (1.72), Nicaragua
(1.58), Peru (1.34), Colombia (1.24), and Ecuador (.57).
SCHRANK & PIORE,
ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 22.
119. SCHRANK & PIoRE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 22.
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Chile has also increased the amount of de oficio, or proactive
inspections, since 1990, with some years counting for as much as 50% of
all labor inspections, showing strong governmental will to proactively
enforce the laws.120 Countries in the region with similar rates of
proactive inspections only include Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic
and Nicaragua, all of which hovered in the 41-47% range in 2004.121
Finally, Chile has one of the strongest economies in the developing
world. In terms of gross national income ("GNI"), Chile boasted a per
capita income figure of US $9,396 in 2008, surpassed by none other in
the Southern Cone and only exceeded slightly by Mexico, the Latin
American leader, with US $9,980 GNI per capita.12 2 Such has been the
success of the Chilean economy that in 2010 Chile was admitted to the
exclusive ranks of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and
123
Development ("OECD").

The case of "shiny" Chile--otherwise known as the Latin
American "jaguar"-provides us with a case of how a well-working
punitive labor inspectorate functions - or not.
B. A Punitive Administrative Enforcement System
The Chilean labor inspectorate also provides us with a case of how
punitive enforcement works. Different from its Latin peers, Chile's
labor inspection system is primarily punitive in character. In other
words, the Chilean labor inspectorate is not stereotypically "Latin"
because it is punitive and not remedial or conciliatory in nature. Hence,
the Chilean case is not just about a likely, well-working inspectorate, but
a punitive one, as well.

120. Cdsar F. Rosado Marzdn, Of Labor Inspectors and Judges: ChileanLabor Law
Enforcement After Pinochet (and What the United States Can Do to Help), 54 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 497, 506 (2010).
121. SCHRANK & PIoRE, ECLAC/MExico, supra note 67, at 16.
122. Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations, Economy Characteristics,
THE

WORLD

BANK,

http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/economycharacteristics
(last
visited June 11, 2012). However, some Caribbean nations boast much larger GNI
numbers, such as the Bahamas with $22,906.60, Trinidad and Tobago with $16,538.30,
Puerto Rico with $15,629.60, and St. Kitts with 10,961.40. Id. However, these
Caribbean countries are much smaller than Chile and do not really provide adequate
comparisons. Moreover, Puerto Rico is not even an independent nation, but a U.S.
territory, which also makes it difficult to compare with Chile.
123. Accession: OECD Welcomes Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia, OECD (May
27, 2010), http://www.oecd.org (search "Accession: OECD welcomes Chile, Estonia,
Israel and Slovenia").
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1. The Labor Directorate
The Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 2 of 1967 ("DFL No. 2") is the
law that created the Direcci6n del Trabajo or Labor Directorate of Chile
(hereinafter referred to as "DT", its Spanish acronym) as we know it
today. 124 The DFL No. 2 states the legal mandates for labor inspection
in the country. 125 Elsewhere I have detailed the basic contours of the
DFL No. 2,126 but it is worthwhile to briefly review them here to better
understand labor inspection in Chile.
The DFL No. 2 was enacted to provide an "adequate economic and
social development of the country," to "scrutinize the correct application
of the laws that guarantee the social rights of workers," to implement the
work laws, and to "aid the government in developing the country's
social policy.' 27 In this manner, the DT was created as an integrated or
centralized work law enforcement agency that enforces all of the
country's work laws.
This set-up is commonplace in Latin
jurisdictions. 128
However, the DT has an array of functions, in addition to labor
inspection that makes the state agency's competences quite broad. Its
main functions include punitive labor inspection, some marginal,
remedial/conciliatory inspection functions, administrative interpretation
of the law, conciliation of employment termination claims, and
mediation of collective bargaining disputes. 129 Other functions include
filing specific claims in courts on behalf of workers, defending its fines
in the labor courts when challenged by employers, providing a public
registry (registro)of temporary employment agencies ("temp agencies")
and attesting documents ('fe ptiblica").130 Here I will only describe the
functions most relevant to this article: labor inspection, marginal
conciliatory and remedial actions, conciliation and mediation, and
124. The first precursor of the current DT was the Oficina del Trabajo (Labor
Office), created in 1907. The Oficina del Trabajo was later replaced by the Direcci6n
Nacional del Trabajo (National Labor Directorate) in 1924, the DT replaced the National
Directorate in 1967. Marcos Antonio Rodriguez Rojas, LA INSPECCI6N DEL TRABAJO:
SURGIMIENTO DE LA FISCALIZACi6N LABORAL 1924-1934

26, 36-37 (Direcci6n del

Trabajo 2010).
125. Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 2, pmbl. [hereinafter DFL No. 2].
126. Rosado Marzdn, supra note 120, at 500-09.
127. DFL No. 2.
128. CoD. TRAB. art. 505, available at www.dt.gob.cl/legislacion/1611/articles59096_recurso_2.pdf.
129. Jos6 Luis Ugarte Cataldo, La inspecci6n del trabajo en Chile: vicisitudes y
desafios, 6 REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE DERECHO SOCIAL 187, 193-196 (2008).
130. Id.
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administrative interpretation of the law.
2. Labor Inspection
Labor inspection focuses on fines and other coercive measures,
making labor inspection particularly punitive in Chile. Inspectors can
visit workplaces at any time, either de oficio-without somebody filing a
13
proceeding charge against the employer--or after receiving a charge. 1
They can inspect the physical premises and business records of
employers at any time of the day or night.' 32 Persons who interfere with
the inspectors' duties can be fined. 3 3 Employers can be held directly
and personally liable for such interferences, as well as for any moral,
physical and material damages suffered by inspectors while performing
their duties. 134 Inspectors can also seek the aid of public law
enforcement officials, including the state police (carabineros)to assist
them in their duties. 135

Once inspectors find that an employer committed a violation of a
work law, they can fine the employer, order the suspension of work
activities, and even close a workplace if there is an immediate hazard to
the life and health of employees, or if employers are otherwise violating
the work laws.

136

The internal rules of the inspections department of the DT further
develop the punitive orientation of the inspectors. According to the
regulations pertaining to the inspectorate, known as Circular 88,
inspectorsshould not assist employers on how to comply with the work
laws. 137 They must use labor inspection as a symbolic act that deters
future infractions. As the rules state:
[I]nspection must be devoid, as a matter of principle, of any assistance
characteristics that try to solve (supposedly) a multiplicity of concrete
cases, one on one, with a strong conciliatory-mediating accent[.]

Instead of obtaining more general levels of compliance with
legislation, [assistance] presupposes that noncompliance with the law
is due primarily to ignorance of the norm, disregarding other more
131. DFL No. 2, art. 27.
132. DFL No. 2, art. 25.
133. DFL No. 2, art. 25.
134. DFL No. 2. art. 25.
135. DFL No. 2 art. 26.
136. DFL No. 2 arts. 28, 31, 34, 38.
137. Gobierno de Chile, Direcci6n del Trabajo, Depto. De Fiscalizaci6n, Circular
88, Generalidades acerca de la fiscalizacion §I(f) (July 5, 2001).
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probable causes for noncompliance such as reduction of economic
costs.

In this manner, inspection does not have as a goal to address
infractions individually, case by case,

. . . but

it uses these situations or

particular realities to produce a demonstration effect in the entire social
context. More than resolving isolated cases, one by one, what really
matters is to produce social scenarios where the most138respect with the
protected legality is attained. (translationby author).

Not only should inspection be devoid of compliance assistance, but
also the rules clearly voice skepticism as to the possibility that assistance
can ever be effective.
The punitive perspective was not only confirmed by my
observations in Chile and the regulations, but also by Rail Campusano,
the former Chief of Inspections of the DT who drafted the regulations
cited above. 13 9 According to Campusano, he drafted the regulations to
create a "strong" inspections model in Chile. 140 For him, compliance
assistance programs are watered down enforcement policies used by
"weak" agencies such as the American OSHA, an agency that in his
14
opinion is entirely ineffective. '
3. Marginal Conciliatory/Remedial Inspection Programs
Notwithstanding its primary, punitive orientation, the DT has used
more than mere fines to compel employer compliance with the country's
work laws. Until the late 1990s, the DT issued "actas de instruccidn"
(writs of instruction), whereby inspectors noted employer infractions and
gave the employer fifteen days to comply with the law before issuing a
fine. 142 These writs of instruction had a quasi-conciliatory or remedial
element to them, as employers would be instructed about their violation
and could avoid a fine by proving that they remedied the infraction and
complied with the law within that fifteen-day period.143 By the late
1990s, however, the DT discontinued writs of instruction and installed
138. Id.
139. Fieldnotes, Csar F. Rosado Marzdn (Mar. 22, 2010).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Interview with Maria Ester Feres, Dir. of Chile's DT from 1994-2004 (May 13,
2008) (notes on file with author); see also Heleen F.P. Ietswaart, Labor Relations
Litigation: Chile, 1970-1972, 16 L. & Soc'Y REv. 625, 642-45 (1981-82) (describing an
historical account of the informal administrative practice).
143. Interview with Maria Ester Feres, supra note 142.
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more formalized procedure to remedial programs
including
45
compliance' 44 and the "training-for-fines" program.1
The compliance assistance program was formalized in 2004146 and
lasted at least through 2010, when the unit in charge of administering the
program within the DT, the Unidad Inspectiva Programadade Oficio
("UIPO"), was recalled by the new government administration of Chile
that came to power that year. 147 Directly borrowing language from the
International Labor Organization ("ILO"), the general goal of the
program was to develop "decent work."' 148 It attempted to plan
programmed, de oficio inspections to tackle systemic violations of work
laws in the country. 149 To do so, itwould first review data previously
collected by the DT, through inspections and complaints, to diagnose
Then it would design an
systematic work law infractions. 5 °
intervention, which would include labor inspections, technical assistance
to the employers, and tripartite roundtables to search for negotiated
solutions.' 51 Through the roundtables, the UIPO attempted to promote
situations where sanctions would not be issued if parties agreed to
progressively
improve and find definite solutions to the infractions
15 2
noted.
Again borrowing language from the ILO, the strategy promoted

144. DIREcCION DEL TRABAJO, 3 ORDEN DE SERVICO (May 14, 2004), available at
http://www.dt.gob.cl/160 1/articles-65345_0S_3 .pdf
145.

C6D.

TRAB

art. 506.

146. Direcci6n del Trabajo, 3 Orden de Servico (May 14, 2004).
147. Fieldnotes, Csar F. Rosado Marz~in (June 29, 2010). During my fieldwork in
Chile, various attorneys that represent employers in the country told me that they thought
that the UIPO was eliminated because it was the office where unions had direct access to
the Director of the DT, which made the office "political." Id.The employer perception
of pro-employee bias at the UIPO was unfortunate given that the UIPO was the office in
charge of providing training, know-how, planning and other resources for compliancebased, non-punitive inspections in the country. Id.
148. See Decent Work Agenda, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--en/index.htm
(last
visited June 11, 2012). The campaign for "decent work" is derived from the
International Labor Organization's "Decent Work" Project. See id It aims building a
concept of work based on, "personal dignity, family stability, peace in the community,
democracies that deliver for people, and economic growth that expands opportunities for
productive jobs and enterprise development." Id.It does this through job creation,
guaranteeing rights at work, extending social protection and promoting "social dialogue"
by "involving strong and independent workers' and employers' organizations [to
increase] productivity, avoid disputes at work, and build cohesive societies." Id.
149. Direcci6n del Trabajo, Orden de Servicio No. 3 (May 15, 2004).
150. Id.at § III.B.
151. Direcci6n del Trabajo, Orden de Servicio No. 3 (May 15, 2004).
152. Id.
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"social dialogue" between regulated actors, including unions and
employers, to find solutions to problems at work and find sustainable
methods for work law compliance. 153 The fine was not going to be the
main tool, but one of various tools in the context of social dialogue to
compel compliance with the law. As the regulations for the program
stated: "[a]ll strategy must, therefore, promote dialogue between the
actors and their commitments for the solution to the problems detected
and, if possible, maintain and provide compliance with the successes that
have been achieved., 154 Social dialogue, in a particular case, could thus
render the sought-after fruits of compliance. The orientation of the
program differed markedly to that of the general inspectorate, as
established by Circular 88.1"'
According to the former Chief of the UIPO, Pablo Leiva Mercado,
compliance assistance was limited to unionized workplaces. 5 6 With
about 16% union density, 157 unionized employers remain a small
minority of employers in Chile. The program was limited in this manner
because Leiva Mercado and the DT at that time believed that compliance
assistance could only be implemented when there were organized
workers in the workplace. Unionized employees could bring worker
concerns to the employer and, in the absence of adequate responses by
the employer, the union could then contact the labor inspectorate to
intervene. 158 In this manner, compliance assistance resembled the
responsive regulation school's pyramidal structure of enforcement, one
153. See
Social
Dialogue, INTERNATIONAL
LABOR
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ (last visited on June 11, 2011). "Social
dialogue" is one of the International Labor Organization's main aims for global
workplace governance. Id. The organization defines "social dialogue" as:
[A]ll types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between, or
among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common
interest relating to economic and social policy. It can exist as a tripartite process, with
the government as an official party to the dialogue or it may consist of bipartite relations
only between labour and management (or trade unions and employers' organizations),
with or without indirect government involvement. Concertation can be informal or
institutionalized, and often it is a combination of the two. It can take place at the
national, regional or at enterprise level. It can be inter-professional, sectoral or a
combination of all of these.

Id.
154. GOBIERNo DE CHILE, DIRECCION DEL TRABAJIO, ORDEN DE SERVICIo
(May 15, 2004).
155. See Circular 88, supra note 138.
156. Telephone interview with Pablo Leiva Mercado (Nov. 30, 2010).
157.

GOBIERNO DE CHILE,

No. 3

CENTRO DE DOCUMENTACION LABORAL, available at

http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/articles-99379_recurso 1l.pdf (last
June 11, 2012).
158. Telephone interview with Pablo Leiva Mercado (Nov. 30, 2010).
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where there is a "slippery slope that leads to a sticky end." The
expectation of the DT was also that compliance assistance would
legitimize labor unions, make them more relevant for workers and
employers, and, therefore, promote more industrial self-regulation in
Chile. Compliance assistance was seen as a way out of command-andcontrol and for a co-regulatory, governance scheme.
Another program, the replacement of fines for training (hereinafter
referred to as "fines for training") program provides that small
employers with nine employees or fewer can request assistance
implementing the work laws in lieu of fines levied by a labor
inspector. 15 9 Employers must correct the behavior for which they were
160
They also
sanctioned within thirty days of the issuance of the 16fine.
1
year.
a
once
fines
in
reductions
such
request
only
can
The law also provides medium-sized employers with twenty-five
employees or fewer with an alternative to the fine, but only for
violations of an occupational health and safety rule if the employer
requests the removal of a fine after the DT issues it. 162 Rather than
merely attending a course, mid-size employers must institute a program
of voluntary compliance with the law that they violated in lieu of the
fine. 163
While some sources state that the training-for-fines program has
been regarded as a successful program in Chile,1 64 empirical studies
show only mildly positive results. 165 In a study with 2004 data,
researchers found no statistically significant results for law compliance
for those employers who participated in the program.67166 However,
stronger results could be gleaned for smaller employers. 1
Even if mildly effective, the program remains limited to smaller

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

COD.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

TRAB.,

art. 506.

SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MExICO, supra note 67, at 15 n.3.
165. Juan Chacaltana, Economic Implications of Labour andLabor-relatedLaws on
MSEs: A Quick Review of the Latin American Experience 34 (Int'l Labour Office, Emp't
at
available
2009),
31,
No.
Paper
Working
Sector,
http://staging2.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed-emp/emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_1 15966.pdf (last visited June 12, 2012) (citing

164.

LuIs MONTERO, GERHARD REINECKE, DANIELA ZAPATA: SUSTITUCION DE MULTAS POR
CAPACITACI6N: EVALUACIN DE UNA EXPERIENCIA (2006)).

166.
167.

Id.
Id.
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employers, and few of them participate in the program. 168 It is truly a
marginal island of compliance assistance in a sea of punishment-based
compliance strategies. In 2004, 1,368 employers were trained, 6 9 while
94,981 inspections were done in the same year resulting in 48,002
fines. 70 The number of participating employers is dwarfed by the large
amounts of inspections and fines issued in the country. 171 Formally nonpunitive programs, in this regard, operate at the margins of centrally
important punitive practices. However, as we will see below, 172 the DT
engages in conciliatory and remedial actions through an unsuspected
manner - administrative interpretations of the law173that instruct the
public about their rights and obligations under the law.
4. Conciliation and Mediation
The DT, through its inspectors, has the authority to summon parties
and documents in order to conciliate or settle cases regarding employee
terminations. 74 Conciliation is generally voluntary, meaning that the
175
parties need not reach a settlement during the conciliation hearing.
Subpoenaed parties, however, must present themselves at the hearing.
The inspector cannot formally adjudicate a case. 176 Only labor courts

168. See Crsar F. Rosado Marzdn, Of Labor Inspectors and Judges: Chilean Labor
Law Enforcement After Pinochet (and What the United States Can Do to Help), 54 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 497, 504 (2010) (citing CoD. TRAB art. 506).
169. Gerhard Reinecke, Presentation at Economia Informal en Argentina, Los
Desafios de la Inclusi6n: Informalidad y politicas piiblicas: El caso de Chile 24 (Nov. 25,
2009) (Power Point slides available at http://www.oit.org.ar/documentos/reinecke.pdf).
170. Direcci6n del Trabajo, Series Estadisticas, Capitulo IV. Actividad Inspectiva,
Cuadro 1 and 1Oa.
171. In fact, during my seven months in Chile, I only even heard about the program
once, and it was not even at the DT. I heard about it when I was observing labor trials at
a Santiago labor court. In that case, an employee was suing an employer for an unjust
termination. In the testimony offered by the worker, she alleged that the employer had
been fined by the DT for not keeping proper documentation. The employer then rebutted
the testimony of the employee by stating that the DT had never sanctioned him. The
employer was merely technically correct since after some more testimony it was
discovered that the DT had fined the employer but then the DT replaced the fine with
training under the program. The discussion of the program had little to do with the
employer's compliance with the labor laws.
172. See infra Part III.B.4.
173. Rosado Marzmn, supra note 120, at 501-02.
174. Id. at 504 (citing DFLNo.2 art. 29).
175. See id (noting that conciliation has recently become mandatory for only wage
and salary cases in limited circumstances).
176. Co1. TRAB., arts. 506, 507.
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have the competence to decide termination cases in Chile. 177 However,
the inspector can fine any party who is summoned but fails to appear
without just cause or who appears without the subpoenaed documents. 178
The conciliation hearing at the DT has also recently become mandatory
for some categories of wage and hours cases of smaller monetary
can serve as formal mediators in
value. 179 Equally, labor inspectors
180
disputes.
bargaining
collective
5. Administrative Interpretation of the Law
Finally, the DFL No. 2 also provides that the Director of the DT its head - can determine the meaning and scope of labor legislation in
the country 181 so that its career servants can uniformly implement the
law across the different regions of Chile. 82 This type of administrative
interpretation of the law issued by the heads of some government
1 83 In the case of the DT,
agencies of Chile is done through dictdmenes.
its Director issues the dictamen. A dictamen directly binds all the
officers of the administrative agency. 184 As explained by a known
Chilean legal scholar, however, dictdmenes also informally bind private
parties, as private parties must adapt their behavior using the dictamen as
a guide if they want to reduce their chances of being fined or otherwise
penalized by the government agency. 85 While not de jure binding,
dict6menes significantly bind parties defacto.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See infra Part III.C.
Id.at art. 30.
Id.
Id. at Title I(d), art. 9.
DFLNo.2art. 1.
E-MAIL WITH SERGIO MEJiA VIEDMA, PARTNER, ARTHUR, HINZPETER, PIZARRO,

HUMtRES & CiA (FORMER SUB-DIRECTOR, DT 1994-2000) (2008).

183. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 130, at 191. Professor Ugarte Cataldo explains that
the department is entrusted with the following tasks: to determine whether labor laws are
being enforced; establish an office; upon request of the interested party, provide advice
on the meaning and scope of labor laws; disclose the social and technical principles of
labor laws; supervise the functioning of union organizations in accordance with the rules
that govern unionization; and undertake any action to prevent or resolve disputes. Id. at
191 n.4. According to Professor Ugarte Cataldo, other Chilean administrative agencies
with similar interpretative functions include the Controlaria General de la Rept'blica
(comptroller), Servicios de Impuestos Internos (treasury), Servicio Nacional de Aduanas
(customs), and Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (financial
regulatory agency), among others. Id.
184. Id. at 192.
185.

Luis Lizama, La Direcci6n del Trabajo: una explicaci6n de su facutad de

interpretarla legislaci6n laboralchilena 59 (1998).
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C. The DTs Relationship with Other Work Law Enforcement
Institutions: Courts and Labor Unions
It is important to underline that in Chile, even though the
inspectorate is centralized at the DT, work law enforcement is not
handled by the DT exclusively. Courts and labor unions also play
relevant roles. 18 6 Courts are the institutions where private parties seek
ultimate redress for violations of the labor code. Courts adjudicate
contractual controversies between workers and employers or between
employers and the DT, when the employer believes that the DT has
exceeded its authority under the law and violated constitutional
precepts.187 In Chile, trial level courts that adjudicate controversies
88
arising under the labor code are specialized labor courts. 1
The labor courts' jurisdiction include not only contractual matters
but also those cases and controversies related to violations of
"fundamental rights"'189 such as employment discrimination and unfair
labor practices, and others arising out of collective bargaining and labormanagement relations.' 90
Labor inspectors cannot adjudicate matters regarding fundamental
rights or unfair labor practices, but they can investigate the claims and
impose administrative fines. 191 The DT can also file a complaint in the
courts and act as a party, 192 in the public interest. In other words, for
workers to actually get a remedy related to a breach of their employment
contract, they will have to file a complaint at the labor court. While the
inspectorate may fine employers for deterrent purposes and close
dangerous workplaces, and perhaps conciliate a dispute regarding a
termination, the courts are the proper forum for workers to seek

186.

See Jonas Malmberg, Enforcement of Labour Law, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF

1945-2004 (Bob
Hepple & Bruno Veneziano eds., 2009) (standing for the proposition that comparative
work law scholarship has consistently acknowledged the role of labor unions, courts
(mostly specialized labor courts) and the administrative state as the three pillars of
effective work law enforcement). In Europe, labor law enforcement historically
combined industrial (collective bargaining), administrative, and judicial processes. One
of these processes may exert primacy in particular countries at particular times. Id.; see
also SERGIO GAMONAL C., FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO LABORAL 105 (2008) (offering a
Chilean perspective on the issue).
187. CoD. TRAB., art. 420.
188. C61. TRAB., art. 415.
189. Id. at Title VII.
190. C61. TRAB., art. 420(e).
191. Id.at arts. 292, 486.
192. Id.
LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 15 COUNTRIES
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personal, monetary remedies and equitable relief. If workers cannot
afford a lawyer to represent them, they can be referred to the Defensoria
Laboral, a subagency that provides lawyers, free of charge, to indigent
employees filing claims in the labor courts.' 93 Labor court decisions can
Court of Appeals and thereafter to the
be appealed to the appropriate
94
Supreme Court of Chile.•
Unions in Chile group themselves into federations and other supraunion agglomerations such as centrals, 195 but only plant-level unions
have the right to bargain collectively for workers. 96 By far, the
principal labor union central of Chile is the Central ••Unitaria
Thde
197
The
organizations.
affiliated
2,667
with
Trabajadores ("CUT"),
second most important organization is the Union Nacional de
Trabajadores ("UNT") with only 279 affiliated organizations.'9 Finally,
the third most important organization is the Central Aut6noma de
Trabajadores ("CAT") with 270 affiliated organizations. 199 However,
more than half of all Chilean labor unions are not affiliated to a union
central.20 0 Out of a total of about one million organized workers in Chile
(including the public sector), more than 600,000 are not part of a labor
union affiliated to a central.2 '
Private labor union density rates in Chile in 2010 stood at less than
16%.202 It has remained at or near that level since the mid-1990s. 20 3 The
lack of strong protections for collective organization and bargaining
have been blamed for that low rate, as well as for the even lower
percentage of workers covered by a collective instrument of any kind,

193. See Rosado Marztn, supra note 120, at 512.
194. Cataldo, supra note 130, at 193-94.
195. COD. TRAB., art. 213.
196. See infra Part V.C.
197. Pablo Obreg6n Castro, S6lo el 22% de los sindicatos del pais pertenecen a la
2011),
4,
(Sept.
Negocios,
y
Economia
CUT,
2
http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=88 06.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Diego L6pez Ferndndez, La ineficacia de derecho de negociar colectivamente,
NEGOCIACION COLECTIVA EN CHILE, LA DEBILIDAD DE UN DERECHO IMPRESCINDIBLE 43,

44-46 (2010). Numbers for 2009 and 2010 were directly obtained from Direcci6n del
available at
1990-2010,
Estadisticas,
Series
de
Compendio
Trabajo,
http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/articles-62614_recurso 1.pdf
(last visited on June 12, 2012).
203. Direcci6n del Trabajo, Compendio de Series Estadisticas, 1990-2010, available
at http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/articles-62614_recurso_1.pdf (last visited
June 12, 2012).
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which stood at 12% in 2008 even though union density stood at 16% in
that same year.2°
The negative gap between coverage and
representation makes Chile a unique country since representation gaps
are normally positive - more workers are covered by collective
instruments than there are union member - as in France.2 °5
The right to strike, the right that workers have to strike without fear
of permanently losing their employment or receive any other negative
sanctions from the employer or the state, exists in a limited form in
Chile. Strikes are also highly regulated.20 6 Workers can only legally
strike after turning down management's final offer during a regulated
bargaining and must begin their strike within three days after turning
down the offer.20 7 The employer can hire replacement workers.20 8
However, different from the United States, replacement workers in Chile
cannot be permanent. They can be hired only to provide the employer
with the necessary services required during the strike.20 9
All this said, labor unions in Chile exist for the general purpose of
auto tutela,210 or self-protection. The Labor Code establishes these selfprotection purposes, including: representing its members in collective
204. ENCLA 2008, Resultado de la Sexta Encuesta Laboral, 158 (2008). The rate
of collective bargaining between 2004 and 2008 in the private sector has been an average
of 10.7%, excluding domestic service.
Gonzalo Durdn Sanhueza, Resultados
Econ6micos de la Negociaci6n Colectiva en Chile, Fundaci6n Sol, available at
http://www.fundacionsol.cl/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Ensayo_2.pdf (last visited June
12, 2012). The weakness of collective bargaining in Chile is also reflected in wages,
whereas 10% of the richest earn fifty-three times more than the poorest 10%, and even
large companies have made large gains over the years while economic growth has
remained constant in Chile. Id. Wages in large firms have fallen by 18% between 1994
and 2006. Id. Lack of protections for unions is also reflected in how convenient it is for
the employer to pursue and destroy the union, as demonstrated in a study by the Labor
Directorate of Chile on the illegal dismissal of workers and its direct impact on the
weakening of the labor movement. Jorge Salinero, La Destrucci6n del Sindicato:
Intolerancia a un Derecho Fundamental, Cuaderno de Investigaci6n N' 20, Santiago,
Departamento de Estudios, Direcci6n del Trabajo 97-98 (2004).
205. ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 450 (Cambridge Univ. Press

2007).
206. See Chile, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, &
Labor (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78884.htm.
207. Chile - Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, INT'L TRADE
UNION

CONFEDERATION,

HTTP://SURVEY.ITUC-CSI.ORG/CHILE.HTML?LANG=EN#TABS-3

(last visited June 29, 2012).
208. Id.
209. CoD. TRAB. art. 381.
210. SERGIO GAMONAL C., DERECHO COLECTIVO DEL TRABAJO 28 (2nd ed. Abeledo
Perrot 2011); FRANCISCO J. TAPIA GUERRERO, SINDICATOS EN EL DERECHO CHILENO DEL
TRABAJO 311 (2d ed. Abeledo Perrot 2007).
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negotiations, enforce collective contracts, 21 1 represent their members in
the exercise of their rights under their individual employment contracts,
if the members so desire,212 aid in the compliance of all workplace laws
and social security, file complaints of violations and noncompliance to
the adequate administrative and judicial authorities and act as parties in
the relevant controversies, when required, 213 among other social,
educational, labor-management cooperation functions.2 14
However, the legal texts do not answer if there a gap between "law
in the books and law in practice,, 215 as is commonly found in work law.
How do all of these pieces fit together in practice? Is the DT effective?
Does punishment work? To these questions we turn next, after
explaining how I gathered the information reported.
V. METHODOLOGY

The American Bar Foundations' 1970 report, The Legal Profession
in the US, established that "[t]he law of the US is today largely
embodied in, shaped by, or effectuated through the rules, regulations,
programs and policies of governmental agencies., 216 This rings as true
today as it did four decades ago. As Robert Kagan pointed out, most of
these rules, regulations, programs and policies, "are rarely reviewed by
courts, or reported in newspapers, or examined by scholars."' 2 17 Given
that these agencies' practices are "buried in filing cabinets, 218 and that
most administrator's decisions are made "informally, undramatically,
and deep in the recesses of bureaucracies, 219 many American legal
academics generally know relatively little of the real practices of
American public administrators and how they apply the law. In the case
of labor regulation in Latin America, our knowledge mostly stems from
lawyers who have focused on legal texts, not empirical evidence or the
practice of law.22 ° Making quality, comparative scholarship is extremely

211.
212.
213.

COD.TRAB. art. 220(1).
C61. TRAB.art. 220(1).
C61. TRAB.art. 220(3)-(4).

214.
215.

See id. at 220(5)-(12).
Roscoe Pound, Law In Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910).

216.

ROBERT KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING A WAGE-PRICE FREEZE
IN THE US (2nd

IX (1980) (quoting AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE LEGAL PROFESSION
ed. 1970)).
217. KAGAN, supra note 216, at ix.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies,supra note 70, at 387.
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difficult when we have little real knowledge of the law in practice.
Therefore, to understand labor regulation in Chile, I used an
ethnographic research approach consisting of participant observation,
key informant interviews and legal and journalistic document analysis.
Participant observation lasted for 29 weeks, or about seven and a half
months.221 During most of those seven and a half months in Chile, I had
an office space at the national headquarters of the DT, located in
downtown Santiago. The Director of the DT granted the office space to
me after I formally requested the space, via letter, to perform an
ethnographic study of the institution.
In my downtown Santiago office, I answered to Omar, the direct
office supervisor 222 and to the Chief of the Research Department of the
DT, who was interested that I share my findings once the study was
concluded. I was given a cubicle located in an office where five labor
inspectors, and one supporting attorney and Omar worked. At my
request, Omar assigned me to labor inspections and other meetings
undertaken by his staff. He also scheduled labor inspections for me to
observe outside of Santiago, with inspectors of various regional offices.
I was able to visit workplaces with the DT inspectors about a dozen
and a half times, and observe the manner in which the inspectors
performed their work. I visited workplaces located in commercial,
industrial, transportation, and entertainment (television stations)
establishments in Santiago. I also visited two very large mines in the
north of the country and one agricultural field in the central part of the
country.
At the DT I also observed "conciliations" settlements of unfair
dismissals. The conciliation hearings that I observed all took place at
DT offices in Santiago and Concepci6n. They were chaired by a labor
inspector who heard oral evidence and reviewed documents regarding
the alleged unfair dismissals. I observed more than thirty such hearings
in the time span of about three discontinuous weeks.
Finally, during my fieldwork in Chile, I also observed labor trials at
the labor courts of Santiago, as well as the country's second largest city
of Concepci6n, the port town of Valaparaiso, and the mining cities of
Antofagasta and Calama. In total I spent about two and half months
observing hearings.
I observed hearings regarding, among other
subjects, unfair dismissals, employment discrimination, unfair labor

221. One week in May of 2008, ten weeks in 2009 (June-July and two weeks in
December), and sixteen weeks in 2010 (March-April and July-August).
222. Omar is the pseudonym given to the Supervisor to protect his identity.
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practices by unions and employers, disputes over wages and hours, and
cases regarding the revision of fines issued by the DT against employers.
The fieldwork at the DT and the courts helped me to better
understand the jurisdictional demarcations of the DT inspectors and the
labor judges, the two main state actors in Chile with the ministerial
duties to enforce the country's work laws. Both at the DT and at the
labor courts I established close, collegial relationships with a handful of
labor inspectors and judges who served as my key informants including
Omar. I interviewed these key informants formally and informally
throughout my fieldwork. Before and/or after inspections of trials, I also
was able to interview labor inspectors, judges and some of the lawyers
for workers and employers involved in the various cases.
Finally, I did significant document collection and review, including
studying the Labor Code, parts of the Civil Procedural Code, the DFL
No. 2 and internal DT regulations and manuals cited herein. I read the
main newspapers, El Mercurio,La Naci6n, La Segunda, and La Tercera
on a regular basis to follow stories related to labor inspection and work
law in the country. Some of the stories widely discussed in the press,
such as the 2010 mining incident and the 2008 Codelco cases regarding
subcontracting, are discussed herein.
I recorded my observations as daily "jottings' 223 during the day in
pocket-sized reporter notebooks.22 4 Almost every evening I spent at
least two hours passing down my "jottings" into more formal notes in
my computer. At certain times during my fieldwork, I also wrote short
memos to myself. These memos served as preliminary analyses of my
data where I tried to make sense of what I was experiencing and
establish themes observed in my fieldwork. In total, I collected 347
pages of mostly single-spaced, typed notes.
Collecting data for this study through participant observation,
interviews and document materials helped me to validate or invalidate
daily observations, or perform
some of my judgments made during my 225
what social scientists call "triangulation."

223. "Jottings translate to-be-remembered observations into writing on paper as
quickly remembered notes about actions and dialogue. A word or two written at the
moment or soon afterwards will jog the memory later in the day and enable the
fieldworker to catch significant actions and to construct evocative descriptions of the
scene."
(1995).

ROBERT M. EMERSON ET AL.,

WRITING ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELDNOTES

19-20

224.

For more detail on fieldwork note taking and methodology see id. at 17-38.

225.

BRYAN S. TURNER, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY
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VI. THE CHILEAN MODEL "IN PRACTICE"
"I like military governments, they keep everyone straight."
Businesswoman overheard by author during flight to Chile, March
2010.
"Well, tell her to come here [to the Labor Directorate], we'll keep her
very straight!"
Nato, 226 Labor Inspector, responding to my comment regarding the
above-stated quote.
While the "Latin" work law regulation and enforcement
administrative system is oriented towards remediation and conciliation
of issues, Chile's is punitive. The quotations above capture the attitude
against employers that I noticed among many labor inspectors. 227
Inspectors employ a variety of sanctions and punishment tools to compel
employer compliance with the country's work laws.
However,
punishment fails to work well when employers resist and mobilize other
institutional players such as courts and other ministries against the
inspectorate. This said, the DT seems to use some remedial tools
effectively, particularly the dictamen.
Although merely an
administrative legal interpretation of the labor code, dictcmenes are
sometimes used as a persuasive tool for work law compliance.2 28
Evidence points towards the need to continue to experiment with such
strategies. Including civil society in the regulatory and enforcement
processes should also prove effective.
A. A First Strength?:Finefor Everything
When the inspector reaches the workplace, she generally identifies
226. Nato is the pseudonym given to one of the labor inspectors I regularly
interacted with in Chile.
227. The sarcasm in the inspector's response when I told him what I overheard the
businesswoman say also captures the tone of the public discourse regarding the conflicts
between employers and the DT under the administration of the Concertaci6n (19902010), where employers were depicted having been pro-dictatorship and right wing, and
the DT and labor advocates opponents of that dictatorship; pro-Concertaci6n and proDT.
228. See Cdsar F. Rosado Marzin, Of Labor Inspectors and Judges: ChileanLabor
Law Enforcement After Pinochet (and What the UnitedStates Can Do to Help), 54 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 497, 504 (2010).
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herself as a labor inspector, asks the guard or other person at the gate or
entrance of the workplace to take her to their manager or supervisor, and
then informs the manager that she is there do a labor inspection.
Usually, the labor inspector does not state what she came to inspect health and safety, or payment of wages, for example. Simply, she tells
the employer to provide her with records, usually attendance records,
internal health and safety rules, labor contracts and payment stubs for all
the employees or a group of them, among other records and documents
that the employer must keep. While the employer obtains the documents,
the inspector requests to speak with the union representatives, if any, the
health and safety committee members129 and/or with individual
employees, or simply starts walking inside the workplace interviewing
individual employees, taking notes about possible violations that are
perceptible to the naked eye, such as lack of safety signs or expired fire
extinguishers and other health and safety equipment.
Meetings with workers usually concern specific issues related to the
original complaint filed at the DT or policy guiding a proactive
inspection. Inspectors also use worker meetings to learn if there are any
other grievances that the workers may have. Inspectors also tend to ask
about other issues outside those in the original complaint, if a complaint
motivated the inspection. They may ask workers if they have any
specific gripes or complaints that they would want to air at that moment.
The inspector takes notes and anything that she hears or sees in violation
of the law may form the basis of a fine.
At meetings with the union, inspectors usually discuss the same
topics as those conferred in meetings with individual employees.
Meetings with the health and safety committee 230 focus on the
formalities: Has the health and safety committee met? Where are the
minutes (that are legally required to be on file)? Who has met? All of
these questions try to get at the formal requisites for health and safety
committees at each workplace in Chile.
When the inspector finally meets with the employer representative
to inspect the books and other documents, she may disclose the main
reason why she visited the workplace, although seldom will she say who

229. The health and safety committees (comit~s paritariosde hygiene y seguridad)
must be established by the employer in any workplace with more than twenty-five
workers. See Chile Law 16.744 of 1968. They are composed of three worker
representatives and three employer representatives. Their incumbency lasts for two
years. See Chile Decreto Supremo No. 54.
230. Every workplace with twenty-six workers or more must have a workplace
health and safety committee (comit~paritario).Chile Law No. 16.744 of 1968, art. 66.
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filed the complaint if the visit was triggered by a complaint. She will
then inspect the books and will likely fine for incomplete records and
any other violations noted during her visit. Sometimes, fines totally
unrelated to the violations that the inspector initially went to inspect are
the ones that most "bite." It also seems that inspectors use this
discretionary power to fine "for everything" strategically.
This strategy of fining for unrelated violations is reminiscent of the
United States Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Attorney
General's strategies to catch the mob. 23' Those officers had a difficult
time breaking organized crime until they devised an alternative route to
convict the criminals - forget the murders and other violent crimes
where no witnesses could be produced. Rather, catch the mob through
tax evasion. 2 The strategy was to get the criminals through unrelated
charges.
There is nothing necessarily illegal in using such circuitous routes
to meet the organizational goals of an administrative agency. These
types of innovations can be classified as "judicial" modes of rule
application. Robert Kagan originally coined this term. Judicial modes
of rule application:
[C]alls for a two-step method of rule application. The decision maker
is expected first to "look backward" to preexisting rules (as
conventionally interpreted in the system) to find the one applicable to
the case at hand. Secondly, the decision maker should "look forward"
to assess the consequences of applying the literally applicable rule or
each arguably applicable rule. He must ensure that the result of
applying the literally applicable rule "makes sense" in233 terms of
existing public policy and conventional notions of fairness.
According to Kagan, the judicial mode is the expected and
desirable way that public administrators should make sense of mandated
23 It helps
rules and seeks compliance with overall goals of their agency. 21
the agency attain its original goals - to "catch the crooks" - without
altering the standards and rules given to the administrators to reach that
goal.
In Chile, the general jurisdiction of labor inspectors enables them to
231. See D. Larry Crumbley & Nicholas Apostolou, America's First (and Most
Fearless) High-profileForensicAccountant, THE VALUE EXAMINER, Sept./Oct. 2007, at
16-18.
232. See id.
233.

KAGAN, supra note 217, at 91.

234.

Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/3

38

Rosado Marzan: Punishment and Work Law Compliance: Lessons from Chile

2012]

WORK LAW LESSONS FROM CHILE

use similar strategies when they do not have the legal authority or other
capacities to fine an employer for a specific infraction or to otherwise
compel it to comply with a particular rule.235 For example, in Chile,
employers can only subcontract workers to perform very specific jobs:
the tasks of an employee in a temporary leave; for extraordinary events
of the employer, such as the organization of a conference; for new and
specific projects; during the initial days of a new enterprise; when
demand suddenly and temporarily increases; and "urgent" tasks.236
However, under some controversial Supreme Court cases in Chile, a
labor inspector cannot officially determine whether an employer legally
or illegally has subcontracted a worker. 237 Only courts can make those
adjudications because they require the interpretation of contractual
terms. Contracts are constitutionally protected in Chile, so only courts of
law can interpret contractual terms, not street level bureaucrats on the
beat, such as labor inspectors.2 38
However, some labor inspectors attempt to innovate in order to
enforce the law albeit without clear guidelines on how to do so.
Inspectors fine employers for the unrelated infraction of "informality"
and other similarly unrelated infractions to enforce the antisubcontracting law.

Informality generally includes fining employers for not producing
an array of documents, such as employment contracts and attendance
records that employers must always have on file, in the premises, and
235. Cdsar F. Rosado Marzdn, OfLabor Inspectors andJudges: Chilean Labor Law
Enforcement After Pincochet (And What the United States Can Do To Help), 54 SAINT
Louis U. L. J. 497, 518 (2010).
236. COD. TRAB. art. 183-N.
237. Supreme Court of Chile Rol. Nos. 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008,
1073-2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-2008, May 12, 2008. See also,
Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 129, at 188 (2008). Conservative scholarship of the
dictatorship era promoted a narrow view of administrative adjudicatory power, taking the
position that only courts have "jurisdictional" authority, not administrative agencies.
According to this scholarship, administrative agencies, different from courts, lack
independence and impartiality. Therefore, when administrative agencies judge matters
regarding "facts, conduct or behavior," that can affect the "patrimony," "honor and
prestige" of a person, because they lack such independence and impartiality, they act as
illegal "special commissions"-a sort of Kangaroo Court-under the Chilean
constitution. Eduardo Soto Klos, El Recurso De Proteccion: Origenes, Doctrina y
Jurisprudencia 114-115 (1981). This narrow view of administrative adjudications has
traction in Chile, albeit not without prominent critics. See Ugarte Cataldo, supra note
129, at 196-203.
238. Supreme Court of Chile Rol. Nos. 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008,
1073-2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-2008, May 12, 2008. Eduardo
Soto Klos, Recurso De Proteccion: Origenes, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia 114-115
(1981).
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ready to be viewed by inspectors. In some of my visits, inspectors tried
to compel employer-principals to stop the practice of illegal
subcontracting by requesting copies of contracts between the employerprincipal and the subcontractor (agent) that had directly hired the
employees.
When the principal failed to produce the requested
contracts, and many times they were not produced because
subcontractors are many times informal agents, inspectors proceeded to
fine the principal and the subcontractor for "informality" on grounds that
they lacked written contracts specified by law.2 39 Such fines are capped
at 5 Unidades TributariasMensales ("UTMs") 240 per month, or about
US $380 (more than a Chilean minimum wage, which today stands at
Chile $182,000241 or US $360) per worker. These fines could add up
when the employer had dozens or hundreds of workers without formal
contracts. In this manner, the punitive orientation, when coupled by the
generalist powers of the inspectorate - they can fine for "anything"provides the inspectorate with leverage to use against employers who
may be violating a particular law egregiously.
There is no hard data that can help us establish whether fining for
unrelated infractions works or not in Chile. However, we can see how in
particular cases it could help inspectors coerce an employer into
complying with the law. This coercion, however, could also support a
culture of resistance against the labor inspectors, as we will see below in
Section VII.
B. A Second Strength?: Fining to "Conciliate"
In addition to inspecting workplaces, as stated above, labor
inspectors in Chile can conciliate individual employee termination cases
where the employees allege an unfair dismissal. Under Chilean law, if
employers cannot justify a worker's termination under one of the various
causes for terminations,24 2 they have to pay severance pay equaling one
239. Under Chilean law, all employers must provide employees with written
contracts. COD. TRAB. art. 9. Failure to do so makes the employer liable to fines. Id.
240. A UTM literally means a Monthly Tax Unit. See Chile Decreto Ley N' 830
Sobre Codigo Tributario, art. 8. It is a measure that is monthly adjusted for inflation
used by the Chilean treasury (Hacienda) to stipulate taxes, fines and other. See id. One
UTM is worth Chile $ 38,557.00, or US $76.25. Five UTMs were thus worth about US
S 381.25. (Currency converted using the American Express currency calculator at
http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic (last visited June 12, 2012).
241. DIRECCION DEL TRABAJO, PORTAL INSTITUCIONAL, http://www.dt.gob.cl (last
visited June 12, 2012).
242. An employment contract terminates - which means, without right for severance
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month of pay for every year worked by the employee, for a maximum
payment equaling eleven months of wages.
Conciliations normally take place in hearing rooms specially
arranged for such purposes in DT offices. There are conciliation offices
across the Chilean national territory. During my approximately three
weeks of conciliation observations, procedures were almost always
identical. Offices opened early in the morning, at or around 8 a.m. By
then, there already was a rather long line of people (perhaps with two to
three dozen people) waiting outside the offices of the DT, many of
whom were attending conciliation, or settlement, of employment
termination cases. In the Santiago offices, which are likely the largest
ones in the country, there were fifteen inspectors performing
conciliations each day. Each inspector was scheduled to hear about
eight cases per day, for a total of 120 cases handled daily by that
243
Santiago office. Each hearing was scheduled for fifty-five minutes.
The workload and quality of the workplace of the inspectors was similar
in other cities, such as Concepci6n, where I also sat in conciliations. La
Serena and Antofagasta had similar offices but I did not sit in
conciliations in those cities even though I did visit the installations.
It is important to underline that in Chile labor courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over the adjudication of these controversies, but employees
may request that the DT conciliate the dispute extra-judicially prior to
filing a complaint in court. Even though the conciliation is formally
voluntary, the DT will subpoena the employer to a hearing. The
employer not only has to appear at the hearing, but also must present
pertinent documents such as employment contracts, assistance records,
payment stubs, proof of health and pension contribution payments, and
- under mutual agreement of the parties, resignation of the employee, death of the
employee, end of the term of employment under the contract, end of the work or service
for which the employee was required, and for Acts of God orforce majeure. C6D. TRAB.
art. 159. The employer may also terminate the employee without requirement to pay
severance under one of the following causes: misconduct of grave character including
probity in the performance of his duties, sexual harassment, illegal acts taken against the
employer or coworker, insults made against the employer, and immoral conduct by the
employee that affects the employer. Other reasons include: competitive practices against
the employees that could have been prohibited by the employer in the employment
contact; two missed absences without just cause by the employee, or on two Mondays in
a month, or a total of three days in the same amount of time, or the unjustified absence
without prior motive that gravely perturbs the activities of the employee; abandonment
of the job by the employee; reckless acts or omissions that affect the security and
functioning of the employer or the security or activity of the workers; intentional torts
against the property of the employer; and grave noncompliance with the contractual
obligations. COD. TRAB. art. 160.
243. Fieldnotes, Csar F. Rosado Marzdn (June 15, 2009).
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other documents.
While the employer need not reach an agreement with the
employee, sometimes the inspectors push them to do so through the use
of fines. The inspectors that I worked with told me that when they
performed conciliations, they would fine employers at the hearing in
order to compel a settlement if they thought that the employer had
broken the law. 244 I actually observed one inspector do this during my
observations in Chile. The case related to the earthquake that shook the
country in February of 2010. The employee of a furniture store alleged
that she was fired unfairly after the earthquake. She alleged that the
employer terminated her even though the furniture store was going to
reopen with many of the former employees.24 5
The employer claimed that the termination was legal and did not
require severance pay under Article 159(6) of the labor code, force
majeure,246 given that his store had been damaged and that he had to
rebuild his business from the ground up.
Rather than merely reconciling the interests in both sides conciliating-, the inspector went into legal reasoning and "held" for
employee. The inspector told the employer that under a very recent and
public dictamen issued by the Director of the DT, the earthquake could
not be used as grounds for alleging force majeure unless the business
had been totally destroyed. Force majeure applied only to unforeseeable
events. Chile was a highly seismic country and the earthquake was
foreseeable. Since the business was not totally destroyed, because it was
going to reopen, force majeure did not excuse the employer from
making the severance payment. Under the law, the inspector said that
the employer had to keep his employees on the payroll or terminate them
with severance pay. The employer should have foreseen the risk of
paying severance as a result of the calamity. If making such payments
was too onerous for the employer, he should have purchased insurance
for earthquake damages, as many other employers had done in Chile.247
Once the employer verbalized his disapproval of the inspector's
determinations, the inspector requested from the employer the
employment contract of the employee, proof that he had made all legal
payments to the employee, and the assistance record. The employer did
not bring any of the documents because he thought that the meeting was
"just conciliation" - a voluntary settlement driven by the reconciliation
244.
245.
246.
247.

Fieldnotes, Cdsar F. Rosado Marzdn (June 25, 2009).
Fieldnotes, Csar F. Rosado Marzdn (Apr. 28, 2010).
COD. TRAB. art. 159(6).
Fieldnotes, Cdsar F. Rosado Marz.n (Apr. 28, 2010).
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of conflicting viewpoints. Almost as to give material effect to her
informal adjudication to compel a settlement, the inspector proceeded to
tell the employer that she would fine him for lacking the requested
paperwork. The fines248would be steeper than the amount of money
claimed by the worker.
The employer became quite upset and said, "This government
provides zero support to employers." He further mentioned that the
"inflexibility" of work laws in Chile was a real problem. The inspector
was unmoved. In total, she was going to fine the employer 30 UTMs, or
about Chile $1.14 million (about US $2,300). Because the worker was
only requesting Chile $618,000 in severance payments, or about US
$1,240, the employer paid the alleged debt to the worker and settled the
case, but not without making further protestations.2 49
Even though inspectors cannot decide liability in termination cases,
the threat of fines by the inspector was not illegal. A particular
regulation of the DT, Circular No. 125 of December 17, 2008, gives the
inspector authority to fine during the conciliation process. With
language much different than Circular 88,250 Circular No. 125 stated that
effective public administration requires "discretion" and "flexibility" to
solve particular cases. As the regulation states: "The administrative
authority enjoys certain discretion to exercise greater flexibility . . . to
attain more efficient administration in benefit of the users of the
[conciliation] system. . . ." (translationby author).25'
The regulation thereafter states that inspectors can fine employers
using their discretion when conciliating individual termination cases. In
determining whether to issue fines, the inspectors must consider the
results of the process (whether conciliation was reached or not) and
whether or not the employer was going to correct infractions. 2
Apparently, rules to conciliate termination cases follow a very different
philosophy than those regarding general labor inspection.
It is important to underline that my observation regarding using
fines to force conciliations was not unique. Not only had other inspectors
told me that they did this in the past, but in 1970-72 Heleen F.P.
Ietswaart, a Yale SJD student doing dissertation work in Chile regarding
labor courts and labor inspection in Chile, reported that labor inspectors
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Circular 88, supra note 137.
251. Direcci6n del Trabajo, Departamento Juridico, Unidad de Conciliaci6n
Individual, Circular No. 125 § 1.12.

252. Id.
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would informally adjudicate cases even if the labor courts had the formal
adjudicatory functions. 3 Inspectors exerted all the authority they could
cases at the DT when they thought
muster to compel employers to settle 254
that the employer had broken the law.
Fining during conciliations is legal, even if harsh, and apparently
has a long tradition in Chile. Inspectors follow the letter of the law, and
help the inspectors obtain the DT's objectives - compel compliance with
the country's work laws. However, fining for unrelated infractions is
not the type of flexibility advocated by students of Latin labor
inspection, where the inspectors target particularly problematic lawbreakers and tailor the rules to the particular circumstances of the
regulated parties. To the extent that these inspectors' discretion provides
them with flexibility, it is only to punish employers into complying with
existing rules.
The "pro-worker" environment that some employers and their
representatives faced at these conciliations was cause of protest of
employer representatives that I interviewed. In this particular case
regarding the earthquake, the employer constantly looked at me seeking
sympathy. In another conciliation where an employee failed to show up
to work without providing notice, the labor inspector attempted to
persuade the employer to settle the case, albeit without making any legal
interpretations. The lawyer told me that the inspectors readily sided with
the workers and rarely, in his estimation, applied the law.255 Even if this
management attorney's perceptions were incorrect, his words showed
suspicion of labor inspectors. In fact, on more than one occasion I saw
employers so upset about the conciliation process that they preferred to
pay fines and face the likelihood of a lawsuit than pay workers who, in
their judgment, were terminated for cause.2 56
C. Maybe a ThirdStrength?: Simply Being a Nuisance
One particular way that labor inspectors, consciously or not, put
pressure on employers is by being a stone in an employer's shoe.
Generally speaking, employers seldom desire anyone entering their
workplace to challenge their authority and halt or slow production.
However, this is exactly what the labor inspectors do when they enter
253. Heleen F.P. letswaart, The Handling of Dismissal Grievances in Chile: A Socio
Legal Study, 273 (1977) (unpublished dissertation on file with author).
254. Id. at 138.
255. Fieldnotes, Cdsar F. Rosado Marzin (June 24, 2009).
256. Fieldnotes, Csar F. Rosado Marzin (June 25, 2009).
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the workplace. They become a nuisance for the employer when they
request that the employer produce records, provide time and space to
speak with the employees, and perform ocular inspections of the entire
workplace. This "nuisance card" also seems perfectly legal and helps
inspectors attain the agency's goal of compelling general compliance
with the work laws.
I observed a particularly telling example of the "nuisance card" in
one inspection of a retail store's consumer credit division.
I
accompanied the inspector at about 5 p.m., or at closing time, to make a
significant information request to the employer related to alleged illegal
changes made to the employment contracts of the employees. We
walked to the workplace in downtown Santiago and asked the human
resources manager of the credit division to provide copies of the
personnel files of his employees, including the labor contracts. The
manager asked, "For which ones, we have more than one hundred
employees." The labor inspector responded, "For all!" The human
resource manager was upset at the request since he was about to go
home when the inspector arrived. He now had to photocopy hundreds, if
not thousands of pages for the inspector. He called his secretary to help
him, but she had been called by an executive to serve coffee and
refreshments, so she could not help him. Therefore, the human resource
manager was all but happy with the request.
This "nuisance card" that I detail had also been observed by Heleen
Ietswaart in the 1970s, when she did a study similar to mine. 25 7 Then,
she recounted that,
In addition, it should be emphasized that the enforcement power of the
Inspectorate goes beyond impositions of fines. A finally enforceable
fine is, after all, not a very strong weapon. But the inspectorate
disposes over something better: the hassle. Labor inspectors may
interrupt work, investigate books, summon people to their office, and
initiate court proceedings. 258
What I call here "the nuisance card," is exactly the same
phenomenon as "the hassle" that Iestwaart noted in her study. Inspectors
can be just one big and expensive "pain in the neck."
I did not stay in Chile long enough to observe the results of the
matter detailed above. Without knowing the results, the case still shows
that at least some labor inspectors use their discretion to innovate within
257.
258.

Ietswaart, supra note 142, at 138.

Id.
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the boundaries of a punishment orientation to seek work law
compliance. But while discretion gives the inspector some leeway to
punish employers into compliance, the punishment orientation does not
seem to enable them to devise ways of adapting the regulations to
particular circumstances that make compliance "good for business" as
traditional Latin inspection is supposed to do. Employers need to
comply or risk some sort of punishment, plain and simple. Nobody likes
nuisances and hassles. As we will see below, such adversarial
relationships do foment a culture of resistance against the work law
enforcers. Such a culture can be detrimental to law compliance.
VII. THE UNDERBELLY: EMPLOYERS RESIST, INSPECTORS ROUT, AND
WORKERS SUFFER

Punishment may sometimes help inspectors obtain leverage to
compel employers to comply with the work laws. However, some
inspectors also told me that they think that fining is not sufficient to
compel compliance with the law. Some inspectors told me that some
employers simply choose to pay the fine and remain noncompliant. In
fact, the human resource manager of a large mine that I inspected in
Chile told me that his firm made so much money, over one billion U.S.
dollars in pure profits each year, that fines were meaningless to its
bottom line. 9 Other employers fail to comply and then challenge the
fine administratively and judicially to get it removed or substantially
lowered. In this manner, labor inspectors note what social-legal scholars
have also realized: that resource-rich actors tend to use the legal system
to persuade adjudicators of the correctness of their actions, creating a
system of justice where "haves" tend to come ahead of the "havenots .

260

As a result of the insufficiency of the fine itself as a deterrent tool,
sometimes inspectors attempt to threaten with a fine, rather than issue it
on the spot, as they are required to do under the law, to compel
The law does not provide inspectors,
compliance with the law.
generally, with the right to threaten with a fine.261 Especially ever since
the DT eliminated the practice of the writs of instruction, inspectors have

259. Fieldnotes, Cfsar F. Rosado Marz.n (July 23, 2009).
260. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974) (analyzing how litigation
can be "redistributive").
261. Circular 88, supra note 138, at § 11.5.4.8.
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to fine immediately once the violation has been noted.262 In this manner,
threats are unauthorized uses of discretion. According to Professor
Robert Kagan, unauthorized discretion is when administrators value goal
attainment but ignore the rules mandated by law to attain such goals.263
Administrators using unauthorized discretion focus on producing the
results they esteem are mandated by law without regard to the rules
provided to reach those results.26 In Chile, while many, if not most
unauthorized threats may go unrecorded and unnoticed, some are aired
by employers and challenged. Sometimes, such challenges result in
court reversals against the DT, hurting the legitimacy of the
institution.265
Zealot inspectors may also use their "big stick" - suspension of
work or workplace closure to - incapacitate the employer. This "big
stick" may create the deterrent effect sought.
However, work
suspensions and plant closings may also trigger employer resistance
through the mobilization of legal and extra-legal resources. In some
instances, employer resistance effectively neutralizes the actions of the
inspectorate.
As we will see below, both unauthorized uses of discretion and
incapacitation - suspending production or closing the workplace may result in opposition that then compels the inspectors to essentially
"give up." In my fieldwork, labor inspectors "gave up" through
legalistic enforcement of the law. As Professor Robert Kagan has also
described, legalism implies that regulators strictly apply existing rules
without regard to whether or not results make sense with the agency's
goals.266 In Chile, some legalistic enforcement of the rules also comes
close to "retreatism," another term used by Professor Kagan to describe
administrative action. Retreatism implies that administrators do not
respect the official goals and rules mandated for the agency at all.267
They stopped enforcing the law.
Unauthorized discretion, legalism, and retreatism, spurred by
employer resistance, form what I here call the "underbelly" of the
Chilean DT.268 Unauthorized discretion and legalism coexist with
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.

KAGAN, supra note 216, at 92-96.
Id. at 92-96.
See Rosado Marzdn, supra note 120, at 510.
266. KAGAN, supra note 216.
267. Id. at 94-95.
268. The term "underbelly" has been inspired by what sociologist Erving Goffman
has called the "underlife" of an organization, where informal practices contradict the
expected and formally defined practices of the organization. See ERVING GOFFMAN,
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effective and legitimate judicial innovations for work law enforcement
as discussed earlier. Altogether, the DT has two sides created by its
punitive orientation: a front of "tough enforcement," and a soft
underbelly where noncompliance is rampant as a result of effective
employer resistance.
A. ResistingIllegal Threats
The Chilean labor inspector may issue fines on the spot, by law.269
Inspectors cannot order employers to actually comply with the law.27 °
However, while Chilean law provides that an inspector issue fines as the
main tool of compliance compulsion, the inspector has discretion to
determine the relative gravity of the infraction and monetary value of the
fine.27' In this manner, the Chilean labor inspector, just as any other
"street-level bureaucrat," has discretion "in determining the nature,
amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their
agencies. 272
Notwithstanding inspector discretion, the DT attempts to establish
rules to limit it. These are contained in an internal regulations document
called Circular 88, a sprawling document with more than 173 legal-sized
pages in ten-point font. 273 Appendixes 6 and 7 of Circular 88 - which
state the rules to consider when applying sanctions and typify infractions
and possible fines - are 43 pages long.274 The rules are so voluminous
that inspectors, as "street-level bureaucrats," have no choice but to
invoke them selectively and pragmatically. 275 Sometimes, inspectors do
not even fine. Rather, they threaten employers in order to meet their
ministerial goal of enforcing the work law. This is crass abuse of
discretion.
ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES

304-05 (1961). The underlife stems from "habitual arrangement[s] by which a member
of an organization employs unauthorized means, or obtains unauthorized ends, or both,
thus getting around the organization's assumptions as to what he should do and get and
hence what he should be," and "[t]hese practices together comprise what can be called
the underlife of the institution, being to a social establishment what an underworld is to a
city," Id.at 189, 199 (emphasis in original).
269. See Rosado Marzdin, supra note 120, at 502.
270. See id.
271. See Circular 88, supra note 137, at § 11.5.4.8, Anexo VI-VII; see also CD.
TRAB.art. 506-07; DFL No. 2, arts. 25, 30, 32, 34.
272. LIPSKY, supranote 68, at 13.
273. See generally Circular 88, supra note 137.
274. Circular 88, supranote 137, at Anexos VI-VII.
275. LIPSKY, supra note 68, at 14.
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But threats do not always work. As threats are essentially
unauthorized uses of discretion, they may even backfire leading the
agency to revert to legalistic enforcement of the law. For example, in a
recent high profile case regarding subcontracting, employers of the
mining industry, among them Codelco, the state-owned mining company
that owns most mines in Chile, complained to the Supreme Court of
Chile that the DT illegally
adjudicated contractual controversies and
276
fines.
with
them
threatened
It all started when the DT attempted to compel Codelco to hire
5000 subcontracted employees that the DT alleged had been illegally
subcontracted.2 77 Codelco and a number of private contractors filed a
recurso de protecci6n, or writ of protection, in court against the DT
alleging that the DT violated its constitutional rights by instructing it to
hire 5000 workers.278 Codelco and a number of private contractors
alleged that DT did not have the authority to adjudicate contractual
279
disputes including those related to the subcontracting arrangements.
The challenges against the DT were first filed in various Courts of
Appeals, where recursos de protecci6n must be filed, and all but one of
those cases was held in favor of Codelco and the other plaintiffs.28 0
When all the cases reached the Supreme Court and were
consolidated for review, the Supreme Court decided that the DT had
violated the constitutional rights of Codelco and its contractors,
including the right of persons to be judged by a court rather than "special
commissions," the right to freely make labor contracts, the right to
engage in legal economic activities, and the right to private property.8 1
Moreover, the court determined that the DT had exceeded its jurisdiction
by adjudicating (calificar) contractual matters, something reserved only
to the authority of the courts.282 Finally, the Supreme Court deemed the
actions of the DT arbitrary and illegal because the DT did not allow the
subcontractors to participate in the proceedings that led to the order that
Codelco to hire the 5000 workers.283
276. See generally Rosado Marzdn, supra note 120, at 515-17. (discussing the
Codelco decisions from 2008).
277. Id. at 515.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at515-17.
281. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 12 mayo 2008, Rol de la
causa: 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 1073-2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008,
1076-2008, 1150-2008.
282. Id.
283. In a concurring opinion, one justice agreed with the majority's result, reasoning
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The case was widely reported in the media and discussed in the
country's editorials. Many of those opinions stated that the DT had
suffered a huge setback and, given that the dispute included three
government players, the DT, Codelco and the Supreme Court, it reported
284
that the government was "divided" as a result of these decisions.
After those decisions, DT leaders decided not to enforce the
subcontracting law. Heads of the DT during that period told me that the
DT could not continue to be seen in constant conflict with other
government and state actors such as Codelco and the Supreme Court.
Therefore, the DT had to take a low profile regarding subcontracting. It
would limit its enforcement of the subcontracting law merely to stating
factual matters in inspection reports and leaving it up to the individual
workers to sue their employers, as improbable as it may be that the law
could be effectively enforced in such a manner. As such, the DT's
response was legalistic. It met the narrow, formal requirements of the
law without regard to the goals of enforcing the anti-subcontracting
statute.
It is important to note that such decisions by the Chilean Supreme
Court narrowing the powers of the labor inspectorate are not uncommon.
Chilean law professor Jos6 Luis Ugarte has already written about this
phenomenon. 2" He has argued that narrowed powers for the DT have
that Codelco had appropriately hired the employees under the anti-subcontracting law.
However, the concurring opinion distanced itself from the majority by arguing that the
DT had the authority to decide whether or not an employer was violating the antisubcontracting law. According to the concurring justice, the DT performed an otherwise
legitimate "administrative act" when it attempted to determine if Codelco violated the
anti-subcontracting law; therefore, the DT's decision did not amount to an
unconstitutional act of a "special commission." Additionally, the concurring opinion
stated that the DT was especially justified in adjudicating the matter given its lack of
standing to take subcontracting cases to the courts. The concurring judge said that
because the Supreme Court took away the DT's authority to adjudicate matters through
the administrative process, the Supreme Court was effectively making it impossible to
enforce the anti-subcontracting law except through the complaints of individual workers,
a remedy he considered "illusory." The judge likely found that enforcing the antisubcontracting law through individual complaints would be "illusory" due to classic
collective action problems associated with large groups of plaintiffs who have individual
claims worth relatively little compared to the cost of the suit. Also, workers would
possibly fear losing their jobs by bringing their claims to the courts as individuals. Corte
Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 12 mayo 2008, Rol de la causa: 877-2008,
953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 1073-2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 11502008.
284. See, e.g., G. Orellana et al., Justicia da Duro Golpe a la Direccindel Trabajo
y Revierte Dict6menes Contra Codelco, ECONOMiA Y NEGOCIOS ONLINE (May 13, 2008),
http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=4698 1.
285. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 129, at 203.
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rendered some laws unenforceable, leading to flexible employment
relations not by the will of the people, but that of the courts. He states
that:
Indeed, this institutional mess that the [courts] have created, based
mostly on ritually elliptical decisions, is allowing something
unexpected for the world of labor relations in Chile: hard and fast labor
flexibility, sustained by the weakening of the regulatory powers of
labor inspection, to such an extent that
286 most legal standards that
protect workers could be unenforceable.
While we may agree or disagree over the legal correctness of the
Supreme Court decisions, the truth is that some of its decisions are, in
fact, rendering some parts of Chilean work law unenforceable. Here, I
argue that part of the problem may lie in the punitive orientation of the
inspectorate and not just conservative jurisprudence.
What could the DT have done differently? Negotiate a plan for
gradual compliance with the firm and the subcontractors. In fact, this is
precisely what the DT did prior to the Codelco case. When the DT first
attempted to enforce the subcontracting law it targeted the banking and
retail industry. It developed a plan to perform industry-wide, de oficio
inspections to ascertain violations of the anti-subcontracting law. Labor
inspectors were sent across the Chilean territory inspecting banks and
commercial establishments to make such findings. After finding
systemic violations, the inspectors issued fines against the employers.
The fines were steep and the DT used the fines to leverage a settlement
with the employers focused on compliance with the law. Employers of
these two industries acceded to hire workers in return for a reduction in
the fines.2 87
Different from the Codelco case, the DT did not order the banking
and retail employers to hire the workers. A negotiated solution proved
effective. While my sources could not confirm to me why the strategy
for Codelco differed - no fine was issued but, rather, a mere threat
thereof was made - they did agree that there were heated discussions at
the DT on how to approach the Codelco problem. Some inspectors
wanted to follow the same strategy used for banking and retail, but
different opinions coming from superior levels of the institution, levels
that also had to manage political pressures from the state-owned

286.
287.

Id. at 203 (translation by author).
Csar F. Rosado Marzdn, fieldnotes of July 4, 2009.
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company and Presidency, prevailed.2 88 The different strategy proved,
however, fateful for the DT.
At least until the last days of August of 2010, when I finished my
fieldwork in Chile, the DT did not proactively or meaningfully enforce
the anti-subcontracting law. Unauthorized discretion against a powerful
employer backfired. Some inspectors, as detailed previously, attempted
to enforce the law through the blunt tool of indirect fining for unrelated
infractions, such as informality. While fining for unrelated infractions
shows inspectors' innovative capacities within a punitive framework,
there is no evidence that this strategy is leading to compliance with the
anti-subcontracting law. In fact, the OECD has already
faulted Chile for
28 9
being noncompliant with its own subcontracting rules.
B. The Case of the 33 Miners in the San Jos Mine: Effective Resistance
Even When Punishment is Legal
In Chile, when the health and safety of employees is in danger, or
employers persist in violating the law, labor inspectors may suspend
work and even close a workplace. 290 In a number of inspections that I
attended, the inspectors partially suspended work when they observed
situations where the health and safety of workers was at stake. In one of
these inspections, an inspection of a truck garage and repair shop in the
industrial commune of Quilicura in Santiago, a worker was using a
diesel-operated forklift that emanated fumes in an enclosed work area.
The labor inspector ordered that the machine be stopped immediately.
He even threatened management with calling the state police
(carabineros)if the machine was not stopped. As a result, the employer
stopped the machine.
In a separate inspection at a different workplace, the same inspector
stopped a worker from working on the ceiling of the workplace while
hoisted on a forklift. According to the inspector, forklifts were made to
hoist things, not people. They were not safety ladders and workers could
get severely hurt if hoisted by the machine. As a result, the worker came
down.

288.
289.

Id.
See

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,

REVIEWS OF LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICIES: CHILE

OECD

(2009); see Diego L6pez, El

Informe Laboral de la OCDE 2009: Es Necesaria Mds Deliberaci6nPoliticay Menos
Recetas,

FRIEDRICH

EBERT

STIFTUNG,

http://library fes.de/pdf-

files/bueros/chile/06785.pdf) (last visited June 8, 2012).
290. Rosado Marzdn, Another Miracle, supra note 14.
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While stopping work is a powerful tool, labor inspectors are very
careful when ordering work suspensions. Workplace closings and
suspension of work have faced stiff opposition from employers, making
them controversial and sometimes placing the DT in the political
spotlight.
For example, in October of 2010, the world watched the incredible
rescue of thirty-three Chilean miners buried under 2300 feet of solid
rock.29 However, the international media said little about a piece of
news that may have dampened the carnival feel of the event, but would
have showed how the entire incident could have been easily averted.
Only three weeks before the incident, a labor inspector had found serious
structural deficiencies in the mine yet did little to avert the disaster.292
The inspector reported these deficiencies after visiting the mine,
confirming that a number of partial collapses in the mine had already
caused grave injuries to some workers.293 In one case, a worker even
suffered an amputation of his limbs.294 The inspector's official report
stated that that the mine had violated Chilean work law by:
Not fortifying the ceiling, having noted that there was no fortification,
reason why a ceiling sheet fell, not evaluating a risk situation ....
Such fact constitutes noncompliance with the general conditions of
safety in the workplace and implies not taking the necessary measures
to protect95 life, health and the general physical integrity of the
2

workers.

This: crass violation of the health and safety regulations was
punished with merely a fine equaling approximately U.S. $6,000.296
While the fine fell within the formal confines of the law, it could have
been much higher.
Even more troubling was the fact that while the Chilean DT had
authority to suspend work when the health and safety of the workers had
been at risk, the DT did not order the mine to suspend work.29 7 After the
news media in Chile discovered that the DT had not closed the mine, the

291. See Victor Herrero, All 33 Miners Rescuedfrom Chile Mine, USA TODAY (Oct.
12:13 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-10-12-Chile14, 2010,
miners N.htm#.T51P58BhJyY.email.
292. Rosado Marzin, Another Miracle, supra note 14.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. DT, Resoluci6n de Multa No. 6279/10/42 (July 9, 2010) (translation by author).
296. Rosado Marzin, Another Miracle, supra note 14.
297. Id.
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DT responded that it did not have authority to close the mine.298
According to the DT, the Sernageomin, a sub-agency of the Mining
Ministry, which has less than 20 inspectors299 for the entire 2,600 milelong country,300 should have taken on the task of suspending work. The
President of the Republic, through his spokesperson, echoed the same
words.3 °1
Certainly, there is some language in the regulations of the
Semageomin that provided the government with a legal hook for its
declarations.30 2 The Sernageomin specializes in geological and mining
matters to produce and provide geological information and products, to
exercise public oversight of the health and safety in the mines as a
general matter, among other functions.3 °3 Its regulations state in Article
13 that it has "exclusive jurisdiction" to, among other things,
"investigate work accidents, including those causing injuries to persons,
grave injuries to property as the Service deems convenient .. ,,304 The
Sernageomin can also compel mines to comply with the corrective
actions that the agency mandates.30 5
However, nowhere in the regulations does it state that the
Semageomin has exclusive jurisdiction over the general health and
safety in the mines, including proactive and preventative inspections and
actions to guarantee the health and lives of workers, as does the DT. In
298. Direcci6n del Trabajo: Sernageomin Autoriz6 Reabrir la Mina San Jos , LA
NACION.CL
(Aug.
17,
2010),
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/site/artic/20100817/pags/20100817100426.html.
299. Diputado Robles Pide al Gobierno Aumentar Fiscalizadoresdel Sernageomin,
LA TERCERA (Aug. 24, 2010), http://latercera.com/noticia/politica/2010/08/674-2862939-diputado-robles-pide-al-gobiemo-aumentar-fiscalizadores-del-semageomin.shtml;
Encuentro de SeguridadMinera de Sernageomin Destac6 Aumento de Fiscalizadores,
AREA
MINERA
(Oct.
13,
2011),
http://www.aminera.com/mas-noticiasnacionales/36049.html.
300. Chile is about 4,300 kilometers long, which translates to about 2,671 miles.
Chile Guide: Practical Information, Tips and Tricks for Chile, CONTACT CHILE,
http://www.contactchile.cllen/chile-guide.php (last visited June 9, 2012).
301. Ricardo Salazar, Ex Director de Sernageomin: "No Quise Ni Accedi a
Reabrir'" la
Mina
San Jos ,
RADIO.UCHILE.CL
(Aug.
17,
2010),
http://radio.uchile.cl/noticias/78897.
302. See Qu es Sernageomin?, SERVICIO NACIONAL DE GEOLOGiA Y MINERiA,
http://wwwold.semageomin.cl/index.php?option=com-content&task-view&id= 13&Item
id=135, (last visited June 9, 2012).
303. Id.
304. Law No. 132, Diciembre 30, 2002, DIARIo OFICIAL [D.O.], § Art. 13 (a) - (b),
available
at
http://www.sernageomin.cl/pdf/mineria/seguridad/reglamentosseguridad-minera/DS 13
2_Reglamento SEGMIN.pdf (translation by author).
305. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/3

54

Rosado Marzan: Punishment and Work Law Compliance: Lessons from Chile

2012]

WORK LAW LESSONS FROM CHILE

fact, the DT inspected the mine and issued fines, which shows that it
certainly has jurisdiction over health and safety concerns in the mines, as
in all workplaces. Moreover, the rules giving the Sernageomin exclusive
jurisdiction over ex post investigations involving workplace accidents in
the mines were drafted as regulations produced by executive fiat - by a
Supremo Decreto, or Supreme Decree - while the DFL No. 2, the
governing statute of the DT and general labor inspection in Chile, is a
Decreto con Fuerza de Ley ("DFL"), or Decree with the Force of Law a law that rests higher in the legal hierarchy in Chile.30 6 DFLs, while
issued by the executive of the country, have been authorized ex ante, as
a blank check by the Chilean Parliament. Supremo Decretos are, plain
and simple, executive-mandated rules that cannot override a DFL3' 7
Finally, the government's interpretation of Chilean law was at odds
with the clear meaning of the DFL No. 2, the general labor inspection
statute, which states in relevant part that, "Labor Inspectors can order the
immediate suspension of work that in their opinion constitute imminent
danger for the health or life of workers ...."308 Therefore, on July 9,
2010 the labor inspector could have ordered the suspension of work in
the mine after the inspector found the workplace to be hazardous. The
inspector did not take such action. Rather, the DT abdicated to the
Sernageomin' s alleged exclusive jurisdiction on the subject, which is at
odds with the law.
Politics and power sometimes speak much more eloquently than
legal text. The main reason for the DT's apprehension in disciplining
the mine resulted from long-standing conflict between the DT and the
mining industry, including that particular mine. In 2003, the DT, under
the direction of Maria Ester Feres, a former, particularly assertive
Director and prominent work lawyer who cut her teeth during the
Allende years, had actually closed the same mine after various accidents
were reported there. 30 9 However, as she confirmed to me, the mine was
reopened shortly thereafter by the Sernageomin, which is known in

306. See generally Sergio Endress G6mez, Essential Issues of the Chilean Legal
System,
GLOBALLEX,
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Chile.htm#_Typesof Legislation (last visited
June 11, 2012).
307. See id.
308. DFL No. 2, art. 28. The original Spanish text reads: "los Inspectores del
Trabajo podrdn ordenar la suspensi6n inmediata de las labores que a su juicio
constituyen peligro inminente para la salud o vida de los trabajadores ....
"
309. Email from Maria Ester Feres (Oct. 1, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Feres].
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Chile for being friendly to mining economic interests. 310 Government
pressures were put on the DT to not close the mine in order to protect
3 11
"job creation.
Such "pressures" from other government and state actors - likely
influenced by employers - is not uncommon at the DT. Maria Ester
Feres told me via email that she was pressured during her tenure as
Director to keep the San Jos6 mine open.312 She also felt pressured to
issue dictdmenes that would weaken the work laws. 313 Other labor
inspectors normally would complain to me about the interventions that
the Treasury Department, the purse of Chile put on the DT, particularly
when the public mining corporation would have to pay higher labor
costs, reducing its profits and the contributions that it could make to the
state coffers.3 14
In 2010, the mine most likely opposed the punitive actions of the
DT. It mobilized resources so that other arms of the state, in this case, a
sub-agency of the Mining Ministry, exercised jurisdiction over mine
safety and closures. Outgunned by the Mining Ministry, which is among
the most powerful ministries in the Chile given the importance of the
mining industry in the country, and without further support from the
Presidency, the DT felt its hands tied.31 5 Thereafter it "gave up" on
policing mine safety in that mine. Rather than pursing a proactive
agenda to protect health and safety in the mine, it abdicated to the
Mining Ministry's alleged exclusive jurisdiction over health and safety
in mines, again, a claim of competency unsupported by the law, and
merely fined the mine the equivalent of U.S. $6,000. The DT's actions
narrowly met legal mandates because it fined the mine under the law,
but disregarded workplace safety in the mine by issuing a practically
meaningless fine.
As these examples showed, the South American "jaguar" has an
"underbelly" characterized by unauthorized discretion, particularly the
310. I heard about these interagency conflicts not only with the Mining Ministry, but
also with the Treasury Department and the Supreme Court of Chile, which is known for
striking down some of the actions of the DT. Cdsar F. Rosado Marzdn, fieldnotes of July
4, 2009.
311. Feres, supra note 309; Ex Directoradel Trabajo: No Pudimos CerrarSan Jos
en 2001 por Presiones del Sector Minero, COOPERATIVA.CL (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.cooperativa.cl/prontus-nots/site/artic/20100818/pags/20100818192921.html
?comentpage=l&tsarart=20100818192921#inicio-lista. The date mentioned in the
article, 2001, is a typographical error.
312. Feres, supra note 309.
313. Cdsar F. Rosado Marzdn, fieldnotes of July 28, 2009.
314. Cdsar F. Rosado Marzdn, fieldnotes of July 4, 2009.
315. Feres, supra note 309.
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use of illegal threats and legalism that coexist with the legitimate,
judicial modes of innovation for rule-application. The jaguar may
pounce, but its soft underbelly is there, encumbering its effectiveness.
VIII. THE PROMISE OF REMEDIAL STRATEGIES BACKED BY "BIG GUNS"
While the inspectorate of Chile primarily employs punishment as a
strategy for compliance, it does have some remedial and conciliatory
strategies, albeit developed in the interstices of the agency. As
mentioned earlier, formal conciliatory and remedial, but marginal,
inspection programs have existed and currently exist at the DT.
However, dictmenes, mere guides interpreting the work laws binding
only to the labor inspectors, also seem to serve important conciliatory
and remedial roles.
Dictmenes are formal roadmaps for the labor inspectors issued by
their boss, the Director. The DT's Director issues dictcmenes so that
inspectors can understand the law and interpret and enforce it
homogenously in the country. As Chilean Professor Luis Lizama has
already noted, while not directly binding on parties - and less so on the
labor courts, which can impose their own interpretation of laws dictdmenes indirectly bind the public.316 Dictdmenes provide the
regulated actors with knowledge about how the DT interprets a
particular law and17 how they should act to escape administratively
3
imposed liability.
While in Chile, I experienced one event where it was clear that
dictdmenes could be quite effective in helping the DT compel employers
to comply with work laws. On February 27, 2010, Chile experienced
one of the most powerful and destructive earthquakes in recorded human
history, measuring 8.8 on the Richter scale. 318 The earthquake and the
tidal wave that it produced destroyed significant infrastructure and killed
hundreds of people.3 19 To make matters worse, during the days after the
calamity, the economy came to a standstill in some parts of the country,
looting took over major cities, and panic and anarchy ruled over many
locations. Employers began to massively terminate employees claiming
that the economic calamity rose to the level of force majeure. Force
316.

Lizama, supra note 185, at 59.

317.
318.

Id.
Alexei Barrionuevo, 1.5 Million DisplacedAfter Chile Quake, NY TIMES (Feb.

27,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/world/americas/28chile.html?pagewanted=all.
319.

Id.
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majeure provides legal justification for dismissal in Chile without
payment of mandatory severance pay. Official statistics showed that
employers justified about 9000 terminations as a result of the
earthquake.32 0 Such terminations led to social crisis in some areas that
already faced major physical destruction as a result of the earthquake. In
Concepci6n, Chile's second largest city, experts estimated a 19%
unemployment rate shortly after the earthquake in a country where a 7 to
10% unemployment rate had been the norm for ten years. 321
In response to the possible social crisis, the President of the
Country, Sebastian Pifiera, ordered the DT to promulgate a dictamen
limiting the scope of terminations that could be justified under force
majeure as a result of the earthquake.322 The DT issued the dictamen on
March 19, 20 10.323 It essentially stated that employers could only use
force majeure to justify terminations in cases where the earthquake
directly damaged the business and rendered productive activity
impossible.32 4 In April 2010, the DT claimed that as a result of the
dictamen, Chilean employers had voluntarily rescinded about 2600
terminations out of a total of 9000 terminations reported after the
earthquake. 325 The dictamen thus proved useful to inform employers
about force majeure terminations in the context of an earthquake and led
many to act commensurately with such administrative interpretations of
the law.
320.

Gobierno Enviar Proyecto de Ley paraPrecisarDespidospor Fuerza Mayor,

SEGUNDA
(Apr.
27,
http://www.nexchannel.cl/nexchannel/noticias/pdf.php?ver-4945892.
LA

2010),

321.
Tasa de Desempleo Llegari a 19% en el Gran Concepci6n por Crisis de
Empresas y Comercio, DIARIO AUSTRAL REGION DE LOS Rios (Apr. 22, 2010),

http://www.australvaldivia.cl/prontus4_nots/site/artic/
20100422/pags/20100422084541.html.
See generally

DIRECCION DEL TRABAJO,
INEQUIDADES Y BRECHAS DE GINERO EN EL EMPLEO: ANALISIS DE LOS RESULTADOS DE LA
ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE COYUNTURA LABORAL ENCLA 2008 (6th ed. 2009), available at

http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/articles-97629_recurso_1.pdf
(providing
general
unemployment levels in Chile).
322. Csar F. Rosado Marzfn, fieldnotes of Apr. 22, 2010 (interviewing the SubSecretary of the Ministry of Labor, Marcelo Soto). See also PiheraRestringe Norma que
Pernite Despidos de Trabajadoresen Zonas Afectadas por Terremoto, EL MERCURIO
(Mar.
22,
2010),
http://www.nexchannel.cl/nexchannel/noticias/noticia_
pescrita.php?nota=4819450. President SebastiAn Pifiera told the press that he will
personally guarantee that the dictamen is enforced. Id.
323. DIRECCIN DEL TRABAJO, ORD. No. 1412/021 (Mar. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.dt.gob.cl/legislacion/1611/w3-printer-97663.html.
324. Id.
325. Gobierno Enviard Proyecto de Ley para PrecisarDespidospor Fuerza Mayor,
LA
SEGUNDA
(Apr.
27,
2010),
http://www.nexchannel.cl/nexchannel/noticias/pdf.php?ver=4945892.
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We can categorize the use of the dictamen as a judicial innovation
by the DT to instruct employees and employers of their rights and
obligations under the work laws as well as a device to obtain compliance
results. As Professor Lizama has stated it can defacto bind parties.32 6 It
can also serve as a "teaching" tool.
But let's not forget, also, that the President of the country put all his
weight on the publication and implementation of the dictamen. The
earthquake dictamen was not a regulation buried in an arcane publication
solely for consumption by lawyers, such as the American Federal
Register. The earthquake dictamen was turned into a political tool of the
Presidency, not just of the DT, and was publicized and discussed
publicly when it was issued. The message was clear: it may not be
binding, but the government would enforce it if workers complained of
an unfair termination. The DT, thanks to government backing, could
"speak softly and carry a big stick." Classic "responsive regulation," and
even conciliatory and remedial Latin inspection, was put to work for a
change.
We should not take the Chilean dictimen's pedagogical elements
too far, however. It is still a top-down, state-centric tool where the
regulated actors play no formal part in determining its content. It does
not conform to ideal New Governance, responsive regulation, or "Latin"
remedial/conciliatory strategies. Its use does attest to the insufficiency
of mere punishment by a labor inspector as a tool of work law
enforcement, validating claims made by New Governance, responsive
regulation, and Latin inspection scholars that punishment-based
regulation is insufficient at best. Therefore, further experimentation
with remedial strategies, and perhaps with more participatory ones,
seems warranted.
IX. CONCLUSION: AGAIN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT

Sometimes, as in all areas of law enforcement, the inspector will better
serve the people he seeks to protect by persuasive or educative appeals
to the better nature of offenders than by prosecution .... [However, a]
growing body of evidence suggests that in many countries the
community has a surprisingly punitive attitude toward corporate
offenses that cause loss of life or serious injury to persons. It follows
from the argument in this book that, if the community wants to indulge
these sentiments fully, it will do so at the expense of further loss of life

326.

Lizama, supra note 185, at 59.
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and limb. It will also be argued, however, that a far more punitive
approach than presently exists in any country is needed....327
It is in the manner cited above that Professor John Braithwaite
begins his now classic book, precursor of the responsive regulation
school, To Punish or Persuade. Those words, almost 30 years old, ring
true today as they rung true back then. In the case of Chile, there is no
doubt that the San Jos6 mine needed to be closed by the labor
inspectorate weeks before it collapsed. It had to be treated much more
harshly by the inspector. It needed to be "incapacitated" with the
inspector's "big gun." It had to be shut down. However, the inspectors
simply gave a fine equaling U.S. $6,000 - chump change for a copper
mine. Why? Part of the story has to do with the general punitive
orientation of enforcement in Chile. The DT was incapable of doing
much else other than fine or close the workplace. It had already closed
the mine in 2003, only to see it reopened by Sernageomin, a move likely
pressured by mining interests. The intrusion of the sub-agency of the
Mining Ministry led the DT to abdicate on the issue of closing the mine.
When the second accident happened in 2010, the DT, pressured to keep
the mine open and incapable of doing anything other than to impose a
fine, chose to simply fine the mine narrowly under the law. The mine
then collapsed.
The story of the mine would have been different if the DT would
have been able to close the mine, convene the workers and owners of the
mine, and perhaps even Sernageomin to structure a process to reopen the
mine only after it met all health and safety standards. But the DT did not
have those powers. It could only fine the mine or suspend work at the
workplace. The decision to reopen the workplace was handed down to
another ministry whose main objective was not to provide safe
workplaces, but rather, had an immediate urgency to keep jobs, which
were later all lost once the mine totally collapsed. Sernageomin retained
authority over the mine with power, not law, on its side.
We can tell a similar story with the Codelco case of 2008. There,
the DT should have had the power to order the mine to employ the 5000
employees if they had, in fact, been illegally subcontracted by the state
firm. But the DT could not make such an order, and they were
reprimanded by the Supreme Court of Chile for doing so. The DT
should have fined the mine and nothing else. Whether the fine was paid
or not, and whether DT could compel Codelco to comply in the future
327. BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR
citation omitted).

PERSUADE,
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was outside the bounds of the DT's competencies. The situation could
have been handled differently. The DT, armed with the capacity to
compel the firm to hire the workers and with other powers to request
Codelco, the subcontractors, and workers' representatives to meet and
bargain a settlement to bring the company into compliance within an
agreeable period of time could have been a more effective measure than
that provided by the blunt mechanism of the fine and making illegal
threats.
In contrast to the Codelco and San Jos6 mining cases, the manner in
which the DT handled the massive terminations during the 2010
earthquake show that persuasion can work as a tactic of first order.
There, the president of the country publicly supported a mere dictamen,
an administrative interpretation of the law that is binding to no one but
the labor inspectors. Courts did not need to defer to it, but the dictamen
was published widely and reported by the media. Even though not
binding, thousands of termination decisions were voluntarily rescinded
by employers. Perhaps it decided that retaining the employees was
cheaper than facing the risk of fines and litigation. Maybe they were
persuaded of the correctness and desirability of the dictamen's
interpretation. Whatever the reasons, employers seem to have complied
with the termination laws. While the dictamen did not involve civil
society in its promulgation-it was clearly a top-down state mandate-it
did use persuasion to make employers comply with the law. Rather than
sending armies of inspectors to examine workplaces and fine employers,
the government "spoke softly but carried a big stick." The strategy
seems to have worked.
The case of Chile continues to remind us that the use of mere
punishment as a main tool to seek compliance with workplace laws is
insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst. Punishment is
important. Ensuring that tough sanctions are available for lawbreakers is
truly important. But punishment should not be the first and main
method to get employers to comply with the work laws.
Given the failures of Chile's punitive approach, current legal
scholarship calls for New Governance approaches, including responsive
regulation and its elements, found in traditional Latin inspection. For
example, in wage theft cases, intentional violators of the law deserve
nothing less than punishment. Increasing sanctions against those
lawbreakers matters. However, it also matters greatly whether or not
employers are violating the law merely out of ignorance. In these cases,
pedagogical inspections may help. Furthermore, tripartite wage setting
may also prove useful in setting minimum wages that are sensitive to
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industry and market contexts.
In the case of collective labor law, reform has proven impossible
for almost thirty years. Even if something like the EFCA is ever
enacted, the efficacy of the statute will be quite uncertain if employers
resist it through actions such as reorganizing production, litigation, and
political jockeying, just like what occurred with the Wagner Act, which
was resisted, challenged, and eventually deradicalized.32 8 Collective
labor law reform through tripartite negotiations, as would be suggested
by New Governance and an "old" governance institution, such as the
International Labor Organization,129 seems warranted now more urgently
than ever.
Finally, swinging the pendulum back to a stricter OSHA will likely
be as useless as the last similar swing. Solutions to OSHA enforcement
that include voluntary codes and the participation of workers in
enforcement, 330 continue to be one of the best prescriptions for change in
health and safety law enforcement in the United States.
Some scholars and others on the Right may argue that my approach
here, as any regulatory approach, distorts markets and makes everyone
worse off. To these critics we only need to show the recent failure of
deregulation spurring the Great Recession as proof that a regulatory
agenda is still needed. On the other hand, some scholars and others on
the Left may view my arguments here as hidden forms of deregulation.
They are far from the truth. Governance, responsive and "Latin" labor
market regulation requires significant state investment in only the best,
most professional regulatory agents possible who can skillfully exert
33'
themselves in particular regulatory problems.
328. See Karl E. Klare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins
of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 293 (1978). See also
JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 2 (1983)

(arguing inherent property rights, needs of capital mobility, and the interests of continued
productivity have led American courts to narrow the scope of labor rights under the
National Labor Relations Act); ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS' LAW: How
TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 21 (2006) (claiming that the common law is
incompatible with labor law, and the fact that judges are trained in the common law has
led to an erosion of worker's rights under the NLRA by the court system).
329. Labour Law, INT'L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-work/labourlaw/lang-en/index.htm (last visited June 11, 2012).
330. See supra text accompanying note 27.
331.
We only need to think back to the Gramscian "war of position" (trench
warfare)- of strategically deploying resources, "on many fronts, in many trenches, with
shifting lines of battle, where victories and defeats occur side by side in the same day",
where even obtaining state power is not enough as such power is contested and
constantly challenged to realize that what I am advocating for here has a rich tradition in
Left, working class advocacy - a "softer" cultural side for social change. Clyde W.
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The South American jaguar provides punitive tools to its labor
inspectorate to enforce the country's work laws. Yet, the punitive
orientation hides, albeit in plain view, an underbelly of noncompliance
where workers cannot be protected and work laws are violated with
impunity. We should expect the same in the United States and beyond if
we focus too narrowly on punishment. Let us give the regulators and
enforcers more power to sanction, but also more diversified toolkits so
that they can utilize their authority in smarter, more effective ways.

Barrow, The Miliband-Poulantzas Debate: An Intellectual History, in

STANLEY
ARONOWITZ AND PETER BRATSIS (EDS.), PARADIGM LOST: STATE THEORY RECONSIDERED
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